Summary

Mazurek v. Armstrong — Per Curiam (1997)

And the basis on which the Court of Appeals did rely (that the purpose of the law may have been to create a "substantial obstacle" to abortion) is positively contradicted by the fact that only a single practitioner is affected. That is especially so since under the old scheme Cahill could only perform [p. 974] abortions with a licensed physician (who also performs abortions) present, see Brief in Opposition 4, meaning that no woman seeking an abortion would be required by the new law to travel to a different facility than was previously available.
Source: Wikisource

Mazurek v. Armstrong — Per Curiam (1997)

It is true that the law "targeted" Cahill in the sense that she was the only nonphysician performing abortions at the time it was passed. But it is difficult to see how that helps rather than harms respondents' case. The dissent does not claim that this was an unconstitutional bill of attainder, nor was that the basis on which the Court of Appeals relied. (Such a contention would be implausible as applied to a provision so commonplace as to exist in 40 other States, see n. 1, supra.)
Source: Wikisource

Mazurek v. Armstrong — Per Curiam (1997)

The dissent says that the Court of Appeals did not resolve any important issue of law in this case, but instead merely remanded to the District Court after "determin [ing] that a further inquiry into the facts [was] appropriate." Post, at 981. We disagree. The Court of Appeals expressly found, and it was necessary to its disposition, that respondents had shown a "fair chance of success" on their claim of undue burden.
Source: Wikisource

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