Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls

Summary

Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls Frisch-Peierls memorandum — - Part 1

At the same time it is quite possible that nobody in Germany has yet realized that the separation of the uranium isotopes would make the construction of a super-bomb possible. Hence it is of extreme importance to keep this report secret since any rumour about the connection between uranium separation and a super-bomb may set a German scientist thinking along the right lines. If one works on the assumption that Germany is, or will be, in the possession of this weapon, it must be realized that no shelters are available that would be effective and that could be used on a large scale.
Source: Wikisource

Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls Frisch-Peierls memorandum — - Part 1

It is a property of these super-bombs that there exists a “critical size” of about one pound. A quantity of the separated uranium isotope that exceeds the critical amount is explosive, yet a quantity less than the critical amount is absolutely safe. The bomb would therefore be manufactured in two (or more) parts, each being less than the critical size, and in transport all danger of a premature explosion would be avoided if these parts were kept at a distance of a few inches from each other.
Source: Wikisource

Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls Frisch-Peierls memorandum — - Part 1

As a weapon, the super-bomb would be practically irresistible. There is no material or structure that could be expected to resist the force of the explosion. If one thinks of using the bomb for breaking through a line of fortifications, it should be kept in mind that the radioactive radiations will prevent anyone from approaching the affected area for several days; they will equally prevent defenders from reoccupying the affected positions.
Source: Wikisource

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