Supreme Court of the United States

Name: Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC
Author: Supreme Court of the United States

Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC (2015)

Summary

“Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC”, published in 2015, is a work by Supreme Court of the United States. It explores elements such as fee, bankruptcy and attorney.

Quotes from Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC (Supreme Court of the United States)

Supreme Court of the United States, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC (2015)

“ In that vein, work performed in defending a fee application may, in some cases, be a relevant factor in calculating “reasonable compensation.” Consider a bankruptcy attorney who earns $50,000—a fee that reflects her hours, rates, and expertise—but is forced to spend $20,000 defending her fee application against meritless objections. It is within a bankruptcy court’s discretion to decide that, taking into account the extensive fee litigation, $50,000 is an insufficient award. ”

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Source: Wikisource

Supreme Court of the United States, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC (2015)

“ But the phrase “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered” neither specifically nor explicitly authorizes courts to shift the costs of adversarial litigation from one side to the other—in this case, from the attorneys seeking fees to the administrator of the estate—as most statutes that displace the American Rule do.
Instead, §330 (a) (1) provides compensation for all §327 (a) professionals—whether accountant, attorney, or auctioneer—for all manner of work done in service of the estate administrator. ”

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Source: Wikisource

Supreme Court of the United States, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC (2015)

“ By contrast, an attorney representing a private party, or a professional working outside of the bankruptcy context, generally faces fee objections made only by his or her client—and those objections typically are made outside of court, at least initially. This process is comparatively simple, involves fewer parties in interest, and does not necessarily impose litigation costs. Consequently, in order to maintain comparable compensation, a court may find it necessary to account for the relatively burdensome fee-defense process required by the Bankruptcy Code. ”

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Source: Wikisource

Supreme Court of the United States, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC (2015)

“ There is no indication that Congress departed from the American Rule in §330 (a) (1) with respect to fee-defense litigation, let alone that it did so in such an unusual manner.
B
The Government’s theory, embraced by the dissent, fares no better. Although the United States agrees that “the defense of a fee application does not itself qualify as an independently compensable service,” it nonetheless contends that “compensation for such work is properly viewed as part of the compensation for the underlying services in the bankruptcy proceeding.” ”

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Source: Wikisource

Supreme Court of the United States, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC (2015)

“ The United States nonetheless contends that uncompensated fee litigation in bankruptcy will be particularly costly because multiple parties in interest may object to fee applications, whereas nonbankruptcy fee litigation typically involves just a lawyer and his client. ”

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Source: Wikisource

Supreme Court of the United States, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC (2015)

“ In our legal system, no attorneys, regardless of whether they practice in bankruptcy, are entitled to receive fees for fee-defense litigation absent express statutory authorization. Requiring bankruptcy attorneys to pay for the defense of their fees thus will not result in any disparity between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy lawyers. ”

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Source: Wikisource

Supreme Court of the United States, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC (2015)

“ We decline to adopt a reading of §330 (a) (1) that would allow courts to pay professionals for arguing for fees they were found never to have been entitled to in the first place. Such a result would not only require an unnatural interpretation of the term “services rendered,” but a particularly unusual deviation from the American Rule as well, as “ [m] ost fee-shifting provisions permit a court to award attorney’s fees only to a ‘prevailing party,’ ” a “ ‘substantially prevailing’ party,” or “a ‘successful’ litigant,” Hardt, 560 U. S., at 253 (footnote omitted) . ”

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Source: Wikisource

Supreme Court of the United States, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC (2015)

“ That qualification is significant. The word “services” ordinarily refers to “labor performed for another.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 2288 (def. 4) (2d ed. 1934) ; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1607 (3d ed. 1933) (“duty or labor to be rendered by one person to another”) ; Oxford English Dictionary 517 (def. 19) (1933) (“action of serving, helping or benefiting; conduct tending to the welfare or advantage of another”) . ”

Supreme Court of the United States

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