Summary

United States v. Jones (236 U.S. 106…

The tax imposed by the act of 1898 was purely a succession tax, a charge upon the transmission of personal property from a deceased owner to legatees or distributees. It was not laid upon the entire personal estate, or upon all that came into the hands of the executor or administrator, but upon 'any legacies or distributive shares' in his charge 'arising from' such estate, and passing to others by will or intestate laws.
Source: Wikisource

United States v. Jones (236 U.S. 106…

The only right which can be said to vest in them at the time of the death is a right to demand and receive at some time in the future whatever may remain after paying the debts and expenses. But that this right was not intended to be taxed before there was an ascertained surplus or residue to which it could attach is inferable from the taxing act as a whole, and especially from the provision whereby the rate of tax was made to depend upon the value of the legacy or distributive share.
Source: Wikisource

United States v. Jones (236 U.S. 106…

Eidman, supra, as having 'conclusively decided' that the tax 'does not attach to legacies or distributive shares until the right of succession becomes an absolute right of immediate possession or enjoyment.' Here, as we have said, there was no right of immediate possession or enjoyment at the time designated in the refunding statute.
Source: Wikisource

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