William J. Brennan, Jr.

“ First. The overbreadth of § 14:103.1 discerned in Cox did not inhere in the terms 'public street' or 'public sidewalk'; it inhered in the phrase 'breach of the peace' as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Louisiana to mean 'to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet.' 379 U.S., at 551, 85 S.Ct. at 462. Nothing in the Louisiana courts' decisions in this case rejects this interpretation of the phrase 'breach of the peace' for the public building phase of s 14:103. ”

“ The appellants in Cox were convicted for their conduct on public streets and sidewalks, while petitioners here were convicted for their conduct in a public library. Because of this it is contended in dissent, post, p. 157, that Cox and this case involve different 'phases' of § 14:103.1-a 'public street and sidewalk phase' in contrast to a 'public building phase.' Insofar as this dissection of the statute is meaningful, it does not make the holding of Cox inapplicable; [3] both phases are overbroad and the overbreadth of each poses a serious threat to the exercise of constitutional rights. ”

“ No limiting construction [1] or legislative revision [2] has intervened, and no circumstance of this case makes that declaration of invalidity less controlling here. The overbreadth of the statute recognized in Cox therefore requires the reversal of these convictions. ”