William J. Brennan, Jr.

Summary

William J. Brennan, Jr. Schilling v. Rogers — Dissent

Even where the applicant chooses to seek an administrative return, suit may be instituted before the administrative action is completed. The administrative remedy and the judicial remedy are each completely independent of the other; Congress has made this clear even to the extent of putting an 'and/or' on the statute books. In no sense, then, can the independent judicial remedy of § 9 be said to be a judicial review of administrative action. It is independent of any administrative action's being taken.
Source: Wikisource

William J. Brennan, Jr. Schilling v. Rogers — Dissent

Generalizations are dangerous, but with some safety one can say that judicial review of such administrative action is the rule, and nonreviewability an exception which must be demonstrated. [1] To be sure, a clear command of the statute will preclude review; and such a command of the statute may be inferred from its purpose, though Leedom v. Kyne, supra, where I thought nonreviewability proved from the congressional purpose, shows that the Court is far from quick to draw such a conclusion.
Source: Wikisource

William J. Brennan, Jr. Schilling v. Rogers — Dissent

Section 32 (a) , under which petitioner has applied for relief, on the other hand provides simply for an administrative remedy. That it does, of course, under § 7 (c) precludes the inference of any independent judicial remedy such as § 9 provides. But there is no reason why it should preclude the inference that administrative action taken under it should be subject to judicial review. The courts have developed many principles defining and limiting the quantum of judicial review that may be afforded administrative adjudication.
Source: Wikisource

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