Summary

Portrait of William O. Douglas William O. Douglas Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp. — Opinion of the Court

We agree with the Court in Krushnic and Virginia-Colorado that every default in assessment work does not cause the claim to be lost. Defaults, however, might be the equivalent of abandonment; and we now hold that token assessment work, or assessment work that does not substantially satisfy the requirements of 30 U.S.C. § 28, is not adequate to 'maintain' the claims within the meaning of § 37 of the Leasing Act. To hold otherwise would help defeat the policy that made the United States, as the prospective recipient of royalties, a beneficiary of these oil shale claims.
Source: Wikisource

Portrait of William O. Douglas William O. Douglas Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp. — Opinion of the Court

If we were to hold to the contrary that enforcement of the assessment work of § 28 was solely at the private initiative of relocators, the 'maintenance' provision of § 37 becomes largely illusory, because relocation of oil shale claims became impossible after the 1920 Act. So if enforcement of the assessment work requirement of § 28 were dependent solely on the activities and energies of oil shale relocators, there was no effective enforcement device.
Source: Wikisource

Portrait of William O. Douglas William O. Douglas Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp. — Opinion of the Court

This case involves six groups of claims to oil shale located in Colorado and asserted under the General Mining Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 91, now 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 26, 28, and 29. Section 28 provides that until a patent issued 'not less than $100 worth of labor shall be performed or improvements made during each year.' [1] And § 29 provides that a patent to the claim could issue on a showing that the claimant had expended $500 worth of labor or improvements on the claim.
Source: Wikisource

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