William Rehnquist

“ The Constitution gives Congress the power " [t] o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.C.onst., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Since the Act expressly stated that it applied to the extent of Congress' power over commerce, the Court in Steele concluded that Congress intended that the statute apply abroad. By contrast, Title VII's more limited, boilerplate "commerce" language does not support such an expansive construction of congressional intent. ”

“ The Commission's early pronouncements on the issue supported the conclusion that the statute was limited to domestic application. See 29 CFR § 1606.1 (c) (1971) ("Title VII . . . protects all individuals, both citizen and noncitizens, domiciled or residing in the United States, against discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin") . While the Commission later intimated that the statute applied abroad, this position was not expressly reflected in its policy guidelines until some 24 years after the passage of the statute. ”

“ Each is plausible, but no more persuasive than that. The language relied upon by petitioners-and it is they who must make the affirmative showing-is ambiguous, and does not speak directly to the question presented here. The intent of Congress as to the extraterritorial application of this statute must be deduced by inference from boilerplate language which can be found in any number of congressional Acts, none of which have ever been held to apply overseas. ”

“ See, e.g., the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2415 (2) (defining "United States person" to include "any domestic concern (including any permanent domestic establishment of any foreign concern) and any foreign subsidiary or affiliate (including any permanent foreign establishment) of any domestic concern which is controlled in fact by such domestic concern") ”