Summary

William Strong Steinbach v. Stewart — Opinion of the Court

And in our law they have been held to enlarge into a fee, a devise which, without them, would have been only a life estate.
If there were any doubts respecting the deed, whether it was intended as a grant or a license, they would be dispelled by noticing the construction manifestly given to it by the parties. This is an aid that may always be called in when the meaning of a contract is ambiguous. [4] There was no necessity for reducing to writing a mere license. Yet this contract was in the form of a conveyance, reduced to writing, and indorsed upon the espediente.
Source: Wikisource

William Strong Steinbach v. Stewart — Opinion of the Court

But assuming that it is presented for our consideration, we are of opinion the deed contains all that was necessary to constitute an operative grant. That it was executed and delivered, and that, in pursuance of it, Hoeppener was put into possession by the grantor, are facts that are not controverted. This is all that, under the civil law, is necessary to transfer titles. Livery of seizin is the controlling fact. Admitting that, under the Mexican law, a contract in writing was necessary to a private conveyance, it is nevertheless true that the form of the instrument was not material.
Source: Wikisource

William Strong Steinbach v. Stewart — Opinion of the Court

That it was more than a license to occupy is plain. Its language is, 'I grant and transfer (cedo y transparo) all the right which I have in the land mentioned, to Don Andres Hoeppener, who shall make' (or have) 'such use thereof as may be convenient to him.' These are not words of mere license. They describe the subject of the grant, not as a possessory right, but as 'all the right' of the grantor 'in the land.' Full effect cannot be given to all the words of the instrument unless it is held to be a conveyance of all Vallejo's title.
Source: Wikisource

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