United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

“ A copyright owner may also seek “any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.” 17 U.S.C. § 504 (b) . If the copyright owner chooses to claim infringer’s profits, “the copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.” ”

“ Here, Delgado’s argument that the district court erred in calculating the value of the PR bonds for sentencing purposes largely mirrors his argument with respect to the value of the PR bonds for purposes of the transactional element of 18 U.S.C. § 666 (a) (1) (B) , discussed above. In short, he argues that although the PR bonds would require the recipient to forfeit $5,000 if they violated the terms of the bond, because the recipient had to pay nothing up front the value of the benefit received must be considered less than $5,000. ”

“ We do not reanalyze the issue in depth. At its core, the “value” someone receives from a PR bond is intertwined with a liberty interest that is hard to definitively quantify. We do not think it was error—let alone clear error—for the district court to value the bonds at the amount Perez’s clients were willing to risk forfeiting in order to secure the bonds. We therefore reject Delgado’s challenge to his sentence.
IV Delgado’s conviction and sentence are affirmed. ”

“ Here, MGE has not shown that bypassing its dongle infringes a right protected by the Copyright Act. MGE’s dongle merely prevents initial access to the software. If no dongle is detected, the software program will not complete the start-up process. However, even if a dongle is present, it does not prevent the literal code or text of MGE’s copyrighted computer software from being freely read and copied once that access is obtained; there is no encryption or other form of protection on the software itself to prevent copyright violations. ”

“ The FBI gave Perez $260 to bribe Delgado, and told Perez that his client, Raul Sanchez, was in jail and had a motion to revoke probation pending in Delgado’s court. Perez called Delgado to set up a meeting with him at Delgado’s house.
On December 13, 2016, Perez went to Delgado’s house wearing a wire. Perez told Delgado that he had a client “sitting in jail” on a motion to revoke. He then asks Delgado: “You think we could do a little wood?” Delgado responds: “Oh yeah ... A lot of wood once we get to some fact finding.” ”

“ Neither the Texas Supreme Court nor any of the Texas appellate courts have specifically applied comment f to determine a defendant’s profits in a trade secret action. Given that comment f’s standard sets a plaintiff’s burden of proof for trade secret damages lower than the standard applied in Elcor, we conclude that the Texas Supreme Court would not adopt the burden-shifting procedures of comment f. ”

“ A On Counts Two through Four, the jury convicted Delgado of federal program bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 (a) (1) (B) . Under that section, it is unlawful when any agent of a state government that receives more than $10,000 from any federal program: [3]
corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more. ”

“ The district court, however, frequently referenced Plaintiffs’ inability to produce evidence in support of the court’s jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. For instance, the district court concluded that “there is insufficient evidence in the record to support [P] laintiffs’ contention” that their cause of action arises from Fratelli Tanfoglio’s forum—related contacts, Tanfoglio II, 2007 WL 1259216, at *6, and “there is no evidence in the record” demonstrating continuous or systematic contacts with Louisiana, id. ”

“ Prescott’s testimony was stricken, MGE offered a final witness, MGE general manager Michael O’Brien, who presented testimony relating only to MGE’s reasonable royalty damages. O’Brien was never designated as an expert on damage calculations. The district court ultimately found his testimony insufficient to permit MGE to offer a jury instruction on reasonable royalty damages. ”

“ Because of the shortcomings inherent in examining a cold appellate record without the benefit of the dramatic insights gained from watching the trial, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution and to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ”

“ A non-American governmental edict may still be copyrighted outside the U.S. Similar to {{PD-in-USGov}}, the above U.S. Copyright Office Practice does not prevent U.S. states or localities from holding copyright abroad, depending on foreign copyright laws and regulations. ”

“ On May 28, 1992, Arnold Jackson ("Jackson") was injured when he dropped a Titan .25 caliber semi—automatic pistol (the "pistol") , causing it to discharge unexpectedly. Jackson was rendered a quadriplegic and eventually died from his injuries. ”

“ We agree that these alternative approaches “are not in conflict” with one another and, generally, that “in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict, a court should affirm if there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict under any of these methods.” Hardin, 874 F.3d at 676.
Here, rather than looking to the bribe amount, the trial evidence focused on the value of the PR bonds to Perez’s clients, who certainly qualify as interested third parties to the transactions between Delgado and Perez. ”

“ Under 17 U.S.C. §§ 504 (a) (1) and (b) , a copyright owner is permitted to recover his own “actual damages,” including lost profits and “reasonable royalty rates,” or what a willing buyer would have been reasonably required to pay a willing seller as a licensing fee for the actual use of the copyrighted material by the infringers. ”

“ As described above, Perez testified on direct that during the timeframe of the alleged conspiracy, Perez would meet at Delgado’s home to buy firewood at inflated prices and request favorable outcomes on behalf of his clients. He also provided a list of clients who he claimed received favorable outcomes as a result of the bribes, including PR bonds with face values of $5,000 and $10,000. Given that a conspiracy conviction can be based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, Shoemaker, 746 F.3d at 623, this evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy. ”

“ The Federal Circuit, in analyzing the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provision, concluded that it “convey [s] no additional property rights in and of themselves; [it] simply provide [s] property owners with new ways to secure their property.” ”

“ Plaintiffs—Appellants Linda Jackson, J ackson’s wife, and heir son Brian (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit on May 25, 1993, in Louisiana state court. Included as defendants were several American companies and three Italian companies: Fratelli Tanfoglio, S.n.c. ("Fratelli Tanfoglio") , Giuseppe Tanfoglio, S.p.a., and Tanfoglio Giuseppe, S.r.l. (collectively, the "Tanfoglio entities") . The American defendants removed the case to federal district court, where Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment of approximately $11 million against the Tanfoglio entities on December 18, 1998. ”

“ MGE sought over $100 million in damages based almost exclusively on the testimony of its only damages expert, Dr. Laurance Prescott. Dr. Prescott’s testimony related to two damage models: (1) MGE’s lost profits; and (2) recovering a reasonable royalty. Notably, Dr. Prescott did not testify to GE/PMI’s profits attributable to the infringement. The district court carried GE/PMI’s Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert [1] objections to Dr. Prescott’s testimony and permitted him to testify at trial. ”

“ Beginning with the 2008 pickup truck incident, Delgado argues that the evidence put forth by the Government is insufficient to show an agreement between Delgado and Perez to commit bribery. We agree that the truck incident does not support the conspiracy conviction. ”

“ After confirming that the case is being prosecuted by the state, rather than the federal government, Delgado implies that the federal government is trying to set up someone. Delgado then explains to Perez why he thinks the federal government would decline to prosecute a case like Maldonado’s: “’Cause they want that skunk to go up the state system which is, in their view, fucking corrupt. ”

“ Delgado tells Perez that he is “going to help [Perez] out” but that they need “to do it right” because he “do [esn’t] want people wondering.” Perez then pays him $260 for “wood” and two days later Sanchez is released on a PR bond. A rational juror could conclude that this was bribery.
Delgado’s nearly identical challenge to his conviction under Count Three similarly fails. The November 2017 sting involving Perez’s client Lucio Leija and his pending motion to revoke played out in similar fashion to the December 2016 sting. ”

“ The two initially met at a restaurant, but then went to Carlos Guerra’s house (no known relation to Roberto Guerra) . There, Hinojosa informed Delgado of his conversation with Roberto Guerra: that he had heard that Delgado “was being investigated by the FBI for selling overpriced firewood ... [or] the mesh case.” Hinojosa also told Delgado (according to the testimony of Carlos Guerra) that Hinojosa knew “an investigator on the inside” who had told him that “there [was] an investigation.” Delgado, upon receiving this news, “was very defiant” and “angry.” ”

“ Count Four was premised on the January 2018 sting where Perez paid Delgado $5,500 in cash after discussing Perez’s client Joe Garza. Delgado repeats his same argument about Perez’s testimony and the lack of an explicit agreement, but also argues that the evidence shows that Delgado met Perez with the expectation that he would be receiving a legitimate campaign contribution rather than a bribe. ”

“ In such cases, while the bribe amount may accurately set a valuation “floor,” there may be reasons to believe that the bribe amount significantly underappreciates the actual value of the transaction. ↑ Delgado makes no argument on appeal that the jury was misinstructed as to the term “value” or that he was limited in any way on this point in making his closing argument. ”

“ Id. § 1952 (b) . Phones are considered facilities in interstate commerce. United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 318 (5th Cir. 2001) .
There is no real dispute that the § 1952 (a) (3) convictions on Counts Five through Seven rise and fall with their corresponding federal program bribery convictions on Counts Two through Four. During both the December 2016 sting (Count Two/Count Five) and the November 2017 sting (Count Three/Count Six) , Perez called Delgado on his phone to set up the meetings at Delgado’s house where Delgado accepted bribes. ”