Ali Ahmad Jalali

“ The tanks and infantry promptly stopped, realizing thatwe had antitank weapons. Their halt enabled us to break contact andtake Habib Noor's body out of the area to Gerdab village—about sixkilometers further to the east. There, I rented a camel and we tookHabib's body to his family at a refugee camp in Pakistan. We buriedhim in the refugee cemetery in Peshawar, even though his home wasin Paktia Province. His family is doing okay now since one of his sonshas a job in Saudi Arabia. COMMENTARY: At this point, the Mujahideen effort was uncoordinatedand put the villagers at direct risk. ”

“ There were dozens of Mujahideen bases in this area that wereaffiliated with major resistance factions. Most of the Mujahideenwere not in their bases but split up into hundreds of small unitsliving in the villages during the winter. On 24 January columns of Soviet and DRA tank and motorizedrifle forces moved from Kabul, Bagram, Jabal-e Seraj andGulbahar (at the mouth of the Punjsher Valley) to establish a widecordon around the green zone on both sides of the Panjsher River.The cordon and sweep operation was backed with extensive airsupport. ”

“ Mujahideen use of battlefield maneuver was commendable. Theyoffset much of their disadvantage in fire power, took dominant terrainand attack positions, seized the initiative from the Soviets by trappingthem and forced the Soviets to stage a rescue by hazarding helicopters.All of this was due to effective Mujahideen maneuver. If theMujahideen had some anti-aircraft weapons, they could have bloodiedthe Soviet force badly. ”

“ We aredestined to die on the day that is destined for us. It will not be pushedbackward or forward." The helicopters continued to fly over, waveafter wave. I saw a group of Mujahideen from the village of Mastali runningaway between Wut Ghar and Dergi Ghar. As they moved along theroad, the Soviets on the high ground began shooting at them. I sawtwo of them go down. Gulrang was one and the son of GhulamSarwar the driver, was the other. Both were killed. The rest escapedinto the mountains. We were close to the river, so we moved to the south of Kamawhere there is a bushy area and a mosque. ”

“ This greatly increased their probability ofhit, prevented effective counter fires, demoralized vehicle crews, creat-ed confusion among their enemy's tank and motorized columns andprevented the employment of accurate, Soviet indirect artillery fireinto the area. Heavy machine guns usually backed up the anti-tankgunners to separate the dismounted infantry from the armored vehi-cles, keep the vehicle crews buttoned up so that their vision wasobscured, and provided covering fire should the anti-tank gunnersneed to leave their positions. ”

“ We hit the Chapter 10, Vignette 1 Page 245 enemy from many directions. We suffered casualties, but the enemy also got a bloody nose. Itwas an infantry fight at close quarters. Three Mujahideen in myimmediate group were killed during our local counterattack. Sovietforces were encircled and the Soviets launched counter-counterat-tacks to aid their encircled forces. We also reinforced our forces. Ourforces were intermingled and the Soviet artillery was unable to fireinto the area of contact for fear of hitting their own troops. Fightingcontinued until dusk. ”

“ The next morning, the enemy resumed the attack, but this timefrom the east using tanks and infantry. We Mujahideen had minedthe Khalifa Saheb Ziarat2 approach. The Soviets brought dogs todetect the mines. My group in this area were in well-covered posi-tions with three RPGs. As the enemy cleared the minefield andmoved forward, we opened fire with our RPGs on their tanks stand-ing in the open cultivated areas. The enemy responded by movingoverwhelming force into the area. The Mujahideen responded bymoving out of their positions to move through gaps to attack theenemy on the flanks. ”

“ This totally changed the situation, with the enemy stoppingand going to ground in defensive pockets. The enemy's momentumwas lost as his attack bogged down. The Soviets occupied villages,farm buildings and orchards and turned them into defensive posi-tions as the second night fell. The Soviets were scattered in five orsix pockets and the Mujahideen kept them from linking up. WeMujahideen knew the terrain and the local civilians helped us movefrom position to position. We attacked the Soviets from all sides, butsuffered casualties as well. ”

“ Farming wasdisrupted and most of the population migrated to Pakistan or the cities. VIGNETTE 2 DEFENDING AGAINST AN OFFENSIVE IN PAGHMANby Tsaranwal Sher Habib In August 1982, the Soviet/DRA forces launched a search anddestroy operation against Mujahideen bases in Paghman. There weretwo enemy columns The main column moved southwest from Kabuland then turned northwest onto the main highway to Paghman. Itsmission was to destroy resistance bases in the center, south and south-west of the Paghman area. The other, smaller column moved northfrom Kabul and then turned northwest. ”

“ At first, theMujahideen were vulnerable to these large-scale operations but thenthey learned to build fortifications throughout the zones, coordinatetheir defense, constitute a reserve and exact a toll on the searchers. ”