Mujahideen

“ The Mujahideen, on the other hand, saw this set up as an excellent opportunity to punish their opponent, pick up some weapons and resupply ammunition. The Mujahideen developed a standard pattern for attacking outposts along this road. They would attack late in the afternoon to minimize the effectiveness of air strikes and artillery. They would fire rockets and mortars at the main base camps on both flanks of the target area to seal the area and hold the attention of the base camps so that they would not interfere with the main attack. ”

“ The Mujahideen preferred to hit the middle of the convoy where there were fewer armored vehicles. If possible, they tried to seal off the section of convoy they were attacking if they meant to loot it. Mujahideen usually prepared fighting positions at the ambush site which enabled them to withstand fire from enemy armored vehicles and, sometimes, helicopter gunships. The most successful Mujahideen ambushes organized the ambush into a heavy weapons support group, flank security groups, an assault group, and a logistics support/spoils removal group. ”

“ Although the popular concept of the Mujahideen combatant is a hardened warrior clutching a Kalashnikov assault rifle, the most important Mujahideen weapon in the conflict was the RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launcher. This Soviet-manufactured, short-range weapon allowed the Mujahideen to knock out tanks, trucks and, occasionally, helicopters. The RPG was a great equalizer and a great weapon in an ambush. Although the Mujahideen were light infantry, heavier crew-served weapons gave them more range and staying power in a fight. ”

“ Consequently the Soviet Union was forced to use mostly its own soldiers to carry the fight to the Mujahideen.
Afghan military officers who openly joined the Mujahideen faced many obstacles in integrating fully into the resistance hierarchy, based in Pakistan. Some faction leaders saw these former military officers as a challenge to their leadership and their factional interests and tried to sideline the professionals. Factions with a fundamentalist Islamic orientation were generally more opposed to accepting those military officers who had trained in and served under the old regimes. ”

“ General Abdul Rahim Wardak The Mujahideen understood that guerrilla war is a contest of endurance and national will. Battlefield victory is almost irrelevant, provided that the guerrilla survives to fight the next of a thousand battles before passing the torch to his children. The Mujahideen did not necessarily expect to win this war but fought because it was the right thing to do — it was a religious and national obligation. They accepted an asymmetry of casualties which eventually, but unexpectedly, led to the Soviet withdrawal. ”

“ The Mujahideen needed to get security out to the key terrain dominating the village to provide timely warning. When the Soviets and DRA had timely intelligence, they were often able to surround sleeping Mujahideen whose guards were within yards of the sleepers. The Soviet forces were probably from the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade in Jalalabad—some 40 kilometers away. The DRA force was probably from the 71st Infantry Regiment—garrisoned only seven kilometers away in Mehtar Lam. The area is open and easily accessible by road. ”

“ The Soviets decided to break this link between the populace and the guerrilla by driving the populace out of the countryside. Soviet air and artillery attacked villages, standing crops, orchards,animal herds, granaries, water mills and irrigation systems. Eventually the populace was driven out of many rural areas and the Mujahideen could no longer readily subsist in these areas. With the agricultural system destroyed, the Mujahideen had to transport their own food and forage. The Mujahideen factions responded to this crisis by establishing fixed supply bases within Afghanistan. ”

“ There was a political advantage to holding districtcapitals, as it conferred a degree of legitimacy on the Mujahideen.However, these capitals were usually located on accessible groundand were not sited for defense against modern artillery and airpower. In this instance, the Mujahideen moved from guerrilla war-fare to a set-piece battle to capture Sorubay and were victorious.However, their attempt to hold the prize resulted in heavy losses andno political advantage. ”

“ That night, theMujahideen consolidated their gains and captured the district head-quarters the next day. The militia had suffered heavy casualties and retreated to the over-watching high ground of a neighboring hill. The Mujahideen sur-rounded the militia positions. The government forces then openednegotiations with the Mujahideen—apparently to gain time As theywere talking, an armored Soviet/DRA column arrived from Kandahar.The Mujahideen withdrew inside Panjwayee. The following night, the Soviet and DRA forces attackedPanjwayee and a heavy house-to-house battle ensued. ”

“ My mobile regiment fought in many provinces in Afghanistan during the war. One of our battles was in Mohammad Agha District of Logar Province. The Jihad began here attacking columns between Gardez and Kabul. This action occured on 8 July 1986. It was a joint action with the HIH Mujahideen commanded by Doctor Wali Khayat and was reported in the media. It was a small ambush involving 13 Mujahideen armed with two RPG-7s, one PK machinegun and 10 AK-47s. Seven of the Mujahideen were my men and six were HIH. We set the ambush in Kotubkhel near the Mamur Hotel which sits beside the main highway. ”

“ We decided to escape into the mountains. The Badrow hills are about three kilometers northeast of the village and lead to the mountains. As we tried to get out of the village, we came under fire from all directions. Within five minutes, we lost 14 Mujahideen KIA and 50 WIA. Mawlawi Niaz Mohammed, the local Mujahideen commander, was among the dead. Faced with withering fire and heavy losses, we retreated back into the village to conduct a desperate defense. ”

“ CHAPTER COMMENTARY The Mujahideen safe-havens in Pakistan and Iran were absolute-ly essential for the survival of their force. Pakistan was particularlyimportant since most of the external aid came through Pakistan.These safe havens allowed the Mujahideen a place to shelter theirfamilies, resupply, treat their wounded, train, sell war booty tosupport their families, rest and exchange tactical information andintelligence. Pakistan provided forward supply depots near theborder and the Mujahideen built most of their major supply depotsnear the Pakistan border. ”

“ Some French doctors worked inside Afghanistan while many other western doctors worked in the border areas of Pakistan. If the wounded Mujahideen managed to survive the harrowing trip to Pakistan, he probably survived. However, a seriously wounded Mujahideen inside Afghanistan usually died.
Tactics
Guerrilla warfare demands quantities of quality light infantry on both sides. The Soviets never fielded enough. The Mujahideen wer enatural light infantry They were hardy, tough, courageous and local. They had high morale, the warrior spirit and excellent tactical intelligence. ”

“ We fired mortars at the north slope andpositioned some Mujahideen on the top of Spin Ghar mountain to drawfire. This was the turning point. All of a sudden, helicopter activityfell off and firing tapered off in the valley. We thought that it was atrick to make us believe that the fighting was over so the Mujahideenwould come out of their hideouts and then they would take us frombehind. We did not expect that such a powerful enemy would abandonan almost certain victory and retire empty-handed. It was late after-noon when I saw civilians coming from Surkhab. ”

“ The Mujahideen were skilled exfiltrators and often small groups of Soviets or DRA guarding the cordon would allow the Mujahideen to escape rather than risk a fire fight at uneven odds. The Soviets resorted to scatterable mines, ground sensors, parachute flares and other technology to prevent escapes, but Mujahideen groups would exfiltrate singly,or in small groups, and regroup outside the encirclement. ”

“ Some 20 or 30 vehicles were burning. Night fell. Soviet artillery pounded Mujahideen positions around Qala-e Naw, but it was not very effective. The Mujahideen moved through the burning and abandoned vehicles removing supplies and scores of weapons. In the morning, the Soviets sent a relief column from Bagram to relieve the trapped column. The Mujahideen withdrew from the battlefield. At 0800 hours, the remnants of the Soviet column moved on to their Bagram base. Mujahideen losses were light. Haji Abdul Qader’s group had two KIA and seven WIA. Total enemy casualties are unknown. ”

“ The noise of the wind and the dust concealedus as we moved between the enemy tanks. There were manyMujahideen in that cordon. There were Mujahideen from two districtsand other areas as well. About 2,000 Mujahideen escaped into thenight. The dust and wind also helped the civilians exfiltrate and cov-ered their escape. When we got out, the wind died down. Later on,people said that this was the hand of God that got them out. TheMujahideen went to the surrounding mountains. I went to Kohe MusaQaleh, the small mountain just north of Musa Qaleh. ”

“ Thepolitics of these factions were determined by their leaders' religiousconvictions—three of which were Islamic moderates and four of whichwere Islamic fundamentalists. Pakistan required that the variousethnic and tribal Mujahideen groups join one of the factions in order toreceive aid. Over time, this provided the leaders of these factions withpolitical power which they used to dominate the politics of post-communist Afghanistan. The Pakistani authorities favored the most-fundamentalist groups and rewarded them accordingly. ”

“ Krer is located east of the Sarkani Districtcenter in Kunar Province. The Mujahideen maintained two bases inthe mountain valley named "Shahid Abdul Latif' and "Fatha." TheMujahideen could reach the Bajuar area in Pakistan from the twobases. The bases served as border supply depots and staging areasfor Mujahideen attacks against the Soviet/DRA forces in KunarProvince. ”

“ The Soviet forces concentrated in Jalalabad in May 1980. We weretipped off that the Soviets planned to advance along the two roads,destroying Mujahideen bases as they went. Their southern columnwould swing north at Fatehabad to seal the pocket. I left my base atChaharbagh and went to my village at Bazetkhel, where I had 80 men.I took 50 of these men north into a Tor Ghar mountain canyon. Weintended to stop the Soviet column on the northern route before theyreached the main Mujahideen base at Katapur. We also hoped to buyenough time to allow the civilians to escape into the mountains. ”

“ The Soviets were very careless of Afghan lives. Theykilled several villagers indiscriminately. They also killed one of mymen who was unarmed. I am glad we drove the Soviets out, but thesubsequent actions of the Mujahideen tarnish their record of victory. Ihave written many poems of protest against their current activities.
COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen were able to fire on the garrisonover a two-hour period since they periodically shifted firing positionsto avoid return fire. The Soviets did not push out any night patrolsto find the firing positions but only replied with artillery fire. ”

“ Many Arabs came to Afghanistan for the jihad. The over-all Afghan impression of the Arab Mujahideen, gathered from our interviews, is that theywere prima donnas who were more interested in taking videos than fighting. Page 130 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War ■ 4%•. ”

“ The Mujahideen were quick to pursue a retreating enemy and theiroffensive into Ta'bils is a good example. Unless a force has establisheda strong, cohesive rear guard, it is disorganized during withdrawal andunable to concentrate combat power. This instant transition to pursuitwas characteristic of the Afghans when fighting the British earlier thiscentury and last. VIGNETTE 10 ZHAWAR ONEby Lieutenant Omar and Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani Zhawar was a Mujahideen base in Paktia Province located somefour kilometers from the Pakistan border. ”

“ The Mujahideen learned to counter air assaults with thoroughplanning, immediate action drills, an early warning system and airdefense ambushes. They learned to mine likely LZs, employ massedRPG fire against hovering or landing helicopters, and to try andoverrun a LZ before the air assault forces had an opportunity to getorganized and oriented. They also learned to "hug" Soviet forces sothat helicopter gunships could not fire at them. ”

“ After theirartillery preparation, enemy tanks and infantry moved along thevalley road from Korek and attacked Mujahideen positions at thecanyon's western mouth. Fighting was heavy. This was our firstexperience fighting the Soviets. Their helicopters came in to evacu-ate their dead and wounded. Our civilians suffered horribly. Thepeople began leaving their homes and fleeing to the mountains.Fighting continued all day long, but the enemy was unable to breakthrough the Mujahideen positions. On the second day, there were fewer Mujahideen fighting, assome had left the area overnight. ”

“ After the Mujahideen left Farah, they losttheir contact with the city population. The city population was nottribal and looked down on the Mujahideen as rustics. In turn, theMujahideen looked down on the city dwellers for their easy life. Sharafat Koh lies about 12 kilometers from Highway 1 and 20 kilo-meters from Highway 517. We attacked convoys near Karvangah,Charah and Shivan and the Soviets manned posts at Karvangah,Charah and Velamekh to protect the convoys. SKY WARRIORS STRIKE THE CANYON In 1982, the Kal-e Kaneske Canyon was our primary base. ”