Ali Ahmad Jalali

“ Mohammad Shah gathered his force and said "Either westand and die here to the last man or we take a risk and charge theattackers and try to break out. We should break out as a group. Ifthey see us, we will have enough firepower to fight them. If theydon't see us, we will all leave together." All his Mujahideen agreed.Some 70 Mujahideen slipped out between the Soviet forces, up thecanyon and into the mountain. Only a few old men remained. Thenext day, the Soviets continued to pound the canyon with air and 5 Troops were from the Soviet 5th Motorized Rifle Division. ”

“ The odds are stacked against the defending guerrilla.The attacker has the initiative, armored vehicles, air power, thepreponderance of artillery and overwhelming firepower. The guerrillatries to match this through use of terrain and prepared defenses.
In the Soviet-Afghan war, the Mujahideen spent a great deal oftime and energy in the defense. Mujahideen defense was associatedwith Mujahideen logistics. Early in the war, Mujahideen logisticsrequirements were primarily concerned with ammunition resupplyand medical evacuation of the wounded. ”

“ Unlike some other areas in Afghanistan, all theMujahideen factions cooperated with each other in the Kandahar area. Whenever there was any fighting, all the Mujahideen wouldmove to the area to help out. All large Mujahideen operations werecombined and were coordinated by the Mujahideen Council. The Malajat area lies to the south of Kandahar. It is a well-irrigated suburb of the city full of villages, irrigation canals,orchards, farms and vineyards. ”

“ The Soviet forces concentrated in Jalalabad in May 1980. We weretipped off that the Soviets planned to advance along the two roads,destroying Mujahideen bases as they went. Their southern columnwould swing north at Fatehabad to seal the pocket. I left my base atChaharbagh and went to my village at Bazetkhel, where I had 80 men.I took 50 of these men north into a Tor Ghar mountain canyon. Weintended to stop the Soviet column on the northern route before theyreached the main Mujahideen base at Katapur. We also hoped to buyenough time to allow the civilians to escape into the mountains. ”

“ Soviet assaults on Mujahideen defenses were initially hamperedby their reluctance to fight at night, their over-reliance on firepowerat the expense of maneuver, and their reluctance to operate far fromtheir armored vehicles. As the war progressed, the Soviets developed Page 340 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War better light infantry, began conducting more night combat and more-skillfully employed air assault and ground combat tactical elementstogether. Still, throughout the war, the Soviets were hampered bylack of sufficient infantry forces. ”

“ The bases had covered bunkers to protect our Mujahideenfrom artillery fire and air strikes. These bunkers were two-threemeters in width and six to eight meters long and were covered withtimber and a meter-thick layer of well-packed earth which resistedartillery fire and most air strikes. Whenever the enemy would cordonoff the Malajat area and launch infantry attacks into the green zone,the Mujahideen would occupy their blocking positions. Most fightingpositions were redundant so that the loss of a fighting position wouldnot adversely affect the defense. ”

“ CHAPTER COMMENTARY The Mujahideen safe-havens in Pakistan and Iran were absolute-ly essential for the survival of their force. Pakistan was particularlyimportant since most of the external aid came through Pakistan.These safe havens allowed the Mujahideen a place to shelter theirfamilies, resupply, treat their wounded, train, sell war booty tosupport their families, rest and exchange tactical information andintelligence. Pakistan provided forward supply depots near theborder and the Mujahideen built most of their major supply depotsnear the Pakistan border. ”

“ DRA and Soviet casualties areunknown, but we were always catching the enemy in surprise attacks,so his casualties must have been much higher than ours. DRA casual-ties were definitely higher than Soviet casualties. I feel that theenemy finally quit due to his casualties.12 COMMENTARY: The Soviets used the conscript DRA infantry extensive-ly and supported them with artillery and air power. The DRA infantrywas poorly trained and equipped and had serious morale problems.The use of DRA forces as "throw-away" infantry did nothing to increasemorale. ”

“ VIGNETTE 6 QALA-E NAW BASE CAMP DEFENSEby Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch Nimroz Province lies in the southwest corner of Afghanistan. It isfairly flat, lightly populated and mostly desert. The population livesin the green zones along the river banks. The Khash Rud is one ofthree rivers which run through the province. It runs northeast tosouthwest. My base was 10 kilometers southwest of the LowkhaiDistrict capital in Khash Rud District. (Map 11-9 - Khash) It is awooded area at the village of Qala-e Naw near the banks of the KhashRud River. ”

“ We prepared for an enemy attacking from Commander Assadullah is from Charquala village in Narang Subdistrict of Kunar Province.He is the son of Mawlawi Mohammad Amin. He graduated from high school and emigrat-ed to Pakistan in 1978 and later entered the Jamiat Islami faction's (JIA) military academyand completed the year-long course. He became a Mujahideen regimental commander of the Krer-based regiment. ”

“ Throughout the war, the Soviets always left one side unguarded.At around noon, 100 to 120 Mujahideen reinforcements arrived from Zalakhan and Walakan, which are south and southeast of Spin Zirat. These villages were in the sector that the Soviets left unguarded. Thearrival of the reinforcements turned the tide and eventually promptedthe Soviets to withdraw about 1800 hours. We destroyed three armored vehicles on the Sarpooza front and two on the Mahkama front.
Sometimes the bombs and artillery fire would block the exits toour bunkers. We would have to go out at night to dig them out. ”

“ Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 11, Vignette 5 Page 291 arrived hours before the Soviets. We vowed to resist and to kill any-one who tried to flee. We took up positions on the high ground onboth sides of the canyon on the ridges of Tora Para, Shna Para andSpina Para. We also put five men on the rear approach to the canyonand put some men on Tor Tsalay to watch the approach from Jar-e AbCanyon. It was raining, but not enough to stop the Soviet aircraft.Observation aircraft flew over and then fighter-bombers flew over ingroups of three. They made bombing runs on us. ”

“ The popular image of the guerrilla is a small force carryingan assortment of small arms. Most insurgencies start that way, butsuccessful insurgencies need heavy weapons. The problem withheavy weapons is that they and their ammunition are hard to trans-port. The Mujahideen became very adept at field fortifications anddeveloped shelters which protected them from intense air andartillery attack. On the other hand, throughout the war, theMujahideen had difficulty fighting air and artillery systems and hadto learn how to survive them—particularly when defending. ”

“ A mortar is good against astationary target, but is hard to use against a moving target. Most of the fighting was between their armored vehicles and our recoillessrifles and RPGs. They were so close that we could hear their Russianvoices. They were also using loudspeakers telling us to surrendersince our plight was hopeless and we would be killed. That languagewas Pushto from their Afghans. We answered these broadcasts withfire and destroyed seven tanks and APCS. We shot down one jet andthey intensified their fire. ”

“ Further, if theDRA or Soviets had covertly moved some artillery spotters onto highground before the offensive, they could have unhinged the Mujahideendefenses before they were established. The Soviets had not yet developed their air assault tactics for coun-terinsurgency. The mountain tops of Spin Ghar and Lakay Ghar canhandle heliborne landings and the Mujahideen air defense posture wasnegligible at this point. A small Soviet force, reinforced with mortars,artillery spotters and forward air controllers and machine guns couldhave created havoc from the mountain tops. ”

“ The rural population will-ingly provided food and shelter to the Mujahideen, since theMujahideen were mostly local residents. The Soviets decided to attackMujahideen logistics by forcing the rural population off of their farmsinto refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran or into the cities ofAfghanistan. ”

“ Unlike other areas of Afghanistan, there was little in-fighting among the factions involved in the fighting around Kandahar and the Mujahideen ran thefight cooperatively through regular meetings of a coordination council.This cooperation provided tactical flexibility to the Mujahideen andtheir redundant fortifications ensured that Soviet/DRA offensiveswould never progress far. Most notable is the regular rotation ofMujahideen from the forward positions. A relief in place is a difficultprocedure for the best-trained troops. ”

“ Sometimes the enemy would fire artillery andbomb us at night but would never attack at night. They did not knowtheir way around the area in the dark, so they did not attempt anynight combat. The DRA had a district government post and local militia on theeast bank. We Mujahideen had our families and R&R1 1 facilities onthe east bank since the government would not bomb that area.Supplies came from our homes on the other side of the river, butduring heavy fighting, they could not supply us and we were on ourown. We could not cook since the enemy would shell any smoke theysaw. ”

“ We would let the enemy chase us from strongpoint tostrongpoint and attack him whenever we could. Eventually, theenemy force would become exhausted. When their water and sup-plies ran out, they would break contact and go home. The enemy attack developed as usual and, by the end of the day,the enemy force retired. Unfortunately, my deputy was killed duringthe fighting. In Iran, I heard about the enemy attack, gathered whatMujahideen were available and started back to our base. TheMujahideen at the base evacuated their casualties to Qala-e Naw,Sheshaveh and Radzay. ”

“ CHAPTER 11: DEFENDING BASE CAMPS Although guerrilla forces would like to retain the initiative andnever have to defend, there are times when the guerrilla force mustdefend. The guerrilla can conduct a mobile defense or a positionaldefense. Guerrilla mobile defenses are usually rear-guard actionsdesigned to preserve the main force or draw the attacker into aprepared ambush. Guerrilla positional defenses are normally associ-ated with the defense of a pass, bridge, populated area, base camp orsupply depot. ”

“ Tanks are of little value in the green zone andwould seldom advance there. APCs, however, would advance ininfantry support. However, their movement was also very channel-ized and they were easy to attack on the flank. The enemy would precede his attack with heavy air and artillerybombardment. The Mujahideen would stay in their bunkers to surviveand only leave a few observers in the fighting positions. As soon as theobservers saw the enemy approach, the Mujahideen would come out oftheir bunkers and man the fighting positions. The enemy infantrywould suffer casualties and then fall back. ”

“ After the Mujahideen left Farah, they losttheir contact with the city population. The city population was nottribal and looked down on the Mujahideen as rustics. In turn, theMujahideen looked down on the city dwellers for their easy life. Sharafat Koh lies about 12 kilometers from Highway 1 and 20 kilo-meters from Highway 517. We attacked convoys near Karvangah,Charah and Shivan and the Soviets manned posts at Karvangah,Charah and Velamekh to protect the convoys. SKY WARRIORS STRIKE THE CANYON In 1982, the Kal-e Kaneske Canyon was our primary base. ”

“ The attack on the border post failed andMohammad Shah lost 35 men. His own son lost a leg in the fighting.It was a heavy blow to our group and we felt that Iran had conspiredin our defeat. At the time, Mohammad Shah was about to form analliance with the Maoist Gul Mohammad and Parviz Shahriyari.Both were from Harakat (IRMA) and receiving arms from Iran.Under the alliance, we would leave Sharafat Koh and move toChahar Burjak. This would have strengthened the Mujahideen andIran wanted to weaken us and make us dependent on Iran. ”

“ Guerrilla warfare is no different from conven-tional warfare in that a reserve can drastically change the situationthrough quick and effective commitment before the opponent consoli-dates his tactical success. 19 Pakistani Strategic Studies Review, April 1986 notes: "Soviet forces launched air-cum-ground attack on Mujahideen base in Krer area killed 26 Mujahideen destroyed their entirearmament and lost 42 men after 15 hours fighting March 26. ”

“ The Mujahideen were quick to pursue a retreating enemy and theiroffensive into Ta'bils is a good example. Unless a force has establisheda strong, cohesive rear guard, it is disorganized during withdrawal andunable to concentrate combat power. This instant transition to pursuitwas characteristic of the Afghans when fighting the British earlier thiscentury and last. VIGNETTE 10 ZHAWAR ONEby Lieutenant Omar and Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani Zhawar was a Mujahideen base in Paktia Province located somefour kilometers from the Pakistan border. ”

“ They'vetried to conquer the base for years and this is their last throw. If weleave, we will never get in again. If we stop them, then they will notreturn. We replied that the RPGs were not working against sand-bagged tanks. Naqib took an RPG and strode out to the forwardpositions to kill a tank. We commanders stopped him and promisedto fight to the end. Heavy fighting continued throughout that day, but we stopped theenemy and they withdrew to Ta'bils—some kilometers to the south.We pursued them to Ta'bils, engaging the enemy in the streets,killing many of them. ”