Ali Ahmad Jalali

“ From 1980 to 1984, the militia helped many Mujahideen infiltrate into Kabul before defecting en masse to the resistance. Their assistance was particularly important in suporting the withdrawal of Mujahideen strike groups at the end of an action. Such inside help made it possible for a force of more than 100 to launch a raid right in the heart of the enemy stronghold. Ideally, a much smaller group, like a 15-man team, would have been more appropriate to the task. But the Mujahideen preferred to move in large groups. ”

“ We fired mortars at the north slope andpositioned some Mujahideen on the top of Spin Ghar mountain to drawfire. This was the turning point. All of a sudden, helicopter activityfell off and firing tapered off in the valley. We thought that it was atrick to make us believe that the fighting was over so the Mujahideenwould come out of their hideouts and then they would take us frombehind. We did not expect that such a powerful enemy would abandonan almost certain victory and retire empty-handed. It was late after-noon when I saw civilians coming from Surkhab. ”

“ The drivers were dependent on firepower to rescue them, but the convoy was unable to bring firepower to bear to save their column.
Helicopters have an important role in convoy security, not only as scouts, but as a rapid reaction force and as a lift force to move security elements from one piece of dominant high ground to the next. The lack of helicopters deprived the convoy of needed warning and fire-power. The Mujahideen needed radios and early warning pickets to alert ambush forces about the approach of convoys and aircraft. ”

“ The Marine Corps of the 21st century will have tremendous advan-tages over guerrilla forces. Our equipment, technology, training, and support are the best in the world. Yet, technological superiority is notin and of itself a guarantee of success. Insight into our adversary's capabilities, tactics and motivation will provide the decisive edge. The Other Side of the Mountain will help us gain this insight. I heartily recommend this book to all Marines. ”

“ Technology can provide advantages but is not decisive in this type of war. Soviet smart bombs had a decided impact when an appropriate target set could be identified. U.S.-supplied, shoulder-fired Stinger air defense missiles, in the hands of the Mujahideen, created a great deal of consternation and led to a dramatic change in Soviet air tactics. Neither system, however, was a war winner. The Soviet equipment was designed for a different war on different terrain. It failed to function optimally in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan. ”