Ali Ahmad Jalali

“ The Mujahideen's prompt reaction to the enemy attacksaved the day. The Mujahideen had learned that enemy airmobileassaults in a guerrilla-controlled area have little chance of successwhen met with coordinated fire from multiple directions. Dr. Alkozaihad planned for enemy air assault and positioned weapons to deal withthat possibility. On the other hand, the Soviet forces paid heavily for theirattempt to land small units in an area totally dominated by the resis-tance. A heliborne attack may succeed when it is launched against anenemy caught by surprise and unable to respond swiftly. ”

“ CHAPTER COMMENTARY In the early days of the war, Soviet air assault missions were rathertimid and unimaginative. Later, the Soviets became more confidentwith the air assault concept and struck deeper and more aggressively.Ambush forces were delivered by helicopter, and raiding forcesstruck deep at Mujahideen supply bases and staging areas and evenconducted raids against Mujahideen redoubts such as the one at Maro.The Soviets usually sent a ground element to link up with the airassault element if the air assault element had to remain in the area forany length of time. ”

“ The Mujahideen learned to counter air assaults with thoroughplanning, immediate action drills, an early warning system and airdefense ambushes. They learned to mine likely LZs, employ massedRPG fire against hovering or landing helicopters, and to try andoverrun a LZ before the air assault forces had an opportunity to getorganized and oriented. They also learned to "hug" Soviet forces sothat helicopter gunships could not fire at them. ”