Ali Ahmad Jalali

“ Lack of such an arrangement left a sizeable Mujahideenforce without operational support by other local groups, especially inblocking the movement of Soviet/DRA reinforcements.
Guerrilla forces are best employed for actions of short duration.Long, extended operations, such as this seige, asks a lot of unpaidvolunteers. The Mujahideen did assign detachments to cover the approaches to Dehrawud from the south, but, as the seige continued,many of the fighters found more pressing business to attend tothen sitting idly on a mountain. ”

“ In case the tank got stuck, the tank protection group wouldprotect the tank and free it. A 65-man assault force would follow inthe tracks of the tank as it passed throught the minefield. The tankcrew would blow a hole in the wall of the fort using the main gunof the tank. The 11-man tank protection crew would then dismountand secure the hole opening and the 65-man assault team wouldenter the fort. Mujahideen communications personnel would alsohelp in the assault by interrupting the communications betweenthe battalion and regiment. ”

“ Air power, while seldom decisive in guerrilla war, played a majorrole in breaking this seige. Once the Mujahideen assumed static posi-tions, the Soviet Air Force was able to delay the Mujahideen assaultand gain the time needed for the ground forces to reach the battlefield. ”

“ In October, Mujahideen forces from Kandahar under MullaMalang, Faizullah and other leaders joined a contingent of HelmandMujahideen commanded by the late Nasim Akhund Zada, the leadingresistance figure in Helmand Province. Haji Assadullah and someMujahideen fighters from Uruzgan and Baghran areas joined theattacking force. This force eventually numbered over 1,000 men. TheMujahideen force moved along different approaches to Dehrawud andsurrounded the government positions in the area. A 300-man detach-ment sealed off the main approach to Dehrawud from the south alongthe Helmand River. ”

“ Among their weapons were some RPG-7s.When the DRA column entered the kill zone, he sprang the ambush.The ambush destroyed one tank and damaged another. The ambush-ers killed some DRA soldiers and captured 25. Some others escaped.The DRA abandoned one intact tank, but the Mujahideen could notretrieve it due to heavy machine gun fire from the battalion's fort.The fire forced the Mujahideen force back into a side canyon. Whennight fell, Mawlawi Hasan and Khan Zamak led a group ofMujahideen back to the intact tank. The Mujahideen group includedsome former DRA tank crewmen. ”

“ Although theMujahideen groups assigned to cover this approach had left earlier, theterrain did not support tank movement. A Soviet Movement SupportDetachnient (MSD) used road construction machines and demolitionsto open a way through the rocky approaches to Dehrawud for the tanksand APCs. The Soviets conducted airmobile insertions of soldiers onthe heights overlooking the movement route to provide flank security.
By this time, the Mujahideen were too widely dispersed for effec-tive control. ”

“ He trained in theUnited States and attended the Afghan Army Higher Officers Training Institute, where theauthor, Ali Jalali, was his instructor. He joined the resistance and fought in Paktia Province.He fought in Zhawar one and two and at the Satakandow pass. ”