Antonin Scalia

“ That characterization might be understandable if our opinion addressed intervenors who are not themselves affected by the outcome of the lawsuit; but it does not. See infra, at 765. What is at issue here is only the liability of intervenors who enter lawsuits to defend their own constitutional or statutory rights. It seems to us that the dissent dismisses out of hand the legitimate claims of these people, not because they are intermeddlers, but rather because the dissenters have established a judge-made ranking of rights, authorizing Title VII claims to prevail over all others. ”

“ In any case, as discussed above, we decided long ago that in some circumstances the interests of the losing party trump those of the prevailing party under § 706 (k) , so that the latter cannot obtain fees. See Christiansburg Garment, supra. The second respect in which the dissent contends we ignore the "express language" of the statute is that we fail to give effect to its "hostility to categorical rules for the award of attorney's fees," post, at 771, supposedly enshrined in the language that the court "in its discretion, may allow" (emphasis added) a reasonable attorney's fee. ”

“ Adopting the regime proposed by respondents-that those who intervene in a Title VII suit are presumptively liable for fees, while those who take the alternative course of becoming plaintiffs in independent lawsuits attacking provisions of the decree are presumptively shielded from liability-would encourage interested parties to await the entry of judgment and collaterally attack remedial schemes. This would serve the interests of no one: not plaintiffs, not defendants, not intervenors. ”

“ Even less with regard to an innocent intervenor than with regard to an allegedly lawbreaking defendant would Congress have wished to "distort" the adversary process, see Christiansburg Garment, supra, 434 U.S., at 419, 98 S.Ct., at 699, by giving the plaintiff a disproportionate advantage with regard to fee entitlement. Moreover, establishing such one-way fee liability against intervenors would foster piecemeal litigation of complex civil rights con roversies-a result that is strongly disfavored. ”

“ That defendant will, under Newman, be liable for all of the fees expended by the plaintiff in litigating the claim against him, and that liability alone creates a substantial added incentive for victims of Title VII violations to sue. In the present case, for example, TWA paid over $1.25 million in fees to respondents' attorneys. ”

“ Put simply, " [i] n the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser." Id., at 247, 95 S.Ct., at 1616. At issue in this case is one of the congressionally created exceptions to that rule. ”

“ To come, finally, to the aspect of this lengthy litigation giving rise to the issues now before us: Respondents' attorneys petitioned the District Court for an award of attorney's fees against petitioner under § 706 (k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) . The District Court held that " [u] nsuccessful Title VII union intervenors are, like unsuccessful Title VII defendants, consistently held responsible for attorneys' fees," Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Assn., Local 550, TWU, AFL-CIO v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 640 F.Supp. ”

“ Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 766, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1265, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) , while "benefit" seniority is used "to compute noncompetitive benefits earned under the contract of employment," ibid.↑ The language of § 706 (k) is substantially the same as § 204 (b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (b) , which we interpreted in Newman v. ”