Summary

David Hackett Souter Burns v. United States — Dissenting Opinion

Although the reality of any such advantage that might flow from knowing the judge's mind may be debatable, a defendant's desire for it is nothing new. Litigants have always desired greater opportunities to influence courts in the exercise of discretion within permissible limits. And yet it comes as no surprise that in the days before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 due process was not thought to require the notice and arguably enhanced opportunity that the Court today requires. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S., at 16, 99 S.Ct., at 2108.
Source: Wikisource

David Hackett Souter Burns v. United States — Dissenting Opinion

While this right to review is only as good as the record that a defendant can present to an appellate court, prehearing notice of a sentencing judge's intentions will not likely enhance the record for the defendant's benefit. A defendant already has the opportunity and impetus to challenge the factual predicate on which a sentence must stand or fall as reasonable or not.
Source: Wikisource

David Hackett Souter Burns v. United States — Dissenting Opinion

The Court today imposes a procedural requirement neither contemplated by Congress nor warranted by the language of any statute or rule. The Court's inference of a notice requirement from congressional silence rests on a failure to appreciate the extraordinary detail with which the Sentencing Reform Act (in amending Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 and in its other provisions) expressly provides the procedures to be followed in imposing sentence in a federal criminal case.
Source: Wikisource

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