Earl Warren

“ We lack that confidence in cases such as Frothingham where a taxpayer seeks to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.
While we express no view at all on the merits of appellants' claims in this case, [26] their complaint contains sufficient allegations under the criteria we have outlined to give them standing to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction for an adjudication on the merits. ”

“ The concern of Madison and his supporters was quite clearly that religious liberty ultimately would be the victim if government could employ its taxing and spending powers to aid one religion over another or to aid religion in general. ”

“ Consequently, the Government contends that, under no circumstances, should standing be conferred on federal taxpayers to challenge a federal taxing or spending program. [17] An analysis of the function served by standing limitations compels a rejection of the Government's position.
Standing is an aspect of justiciability and, as such, the problem of standing is surrounded by the same complexities and vagaries that inhere in justiciability. ”

“ Justiciability is the term of art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine.
Justiciability is itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope. ”

“ If the District Court in this case were to rule for appellants on the merits of their constitutional attack on New York City's federally funded programs, that decision would cast sufficient doubt on similar programs elsewhere as to cause confusion approaching paralysis to surround the challenged statute. Therefore, even if the injunction which might issue in this case were narrower than that sought by appellants, we are satisfied that the legislative policy underlying § 2282 was served by the convening of a three-judge court, despite appellants' focus on New York City's programs. ”

“ Since we hold that appellants' Establishment Clause claim is sufficient to establish the nexus between their status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged, we need not decide whether the Free Exercise claim, standing alone, would be adequate to conver standing in this case. ”

“ It is true that appellants' complaint states a nonconstitutional ground for relief, namely, that appellees' actions in approving the expenditure of federal funds for allegedly unconstitutional programs are in excess of their authority under the Act. However, the complaint also requests an alternative and constitutional ground for relief, namely, a declaration that, if appellees' actions 'are within the authority and intent of the Act, the Act is to that extent unconstitutional and void.' The Court noted in Zemel v. ”

“ The Government professes not to be bothered by such a result because it contends there might be individuals in society other than taxpayers who could invoke federal judicial power to challenge such unconstitutional appropriations. ”

“ A taxpayer may or may not have the requisite personal stake in the outcome, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. Therefore, we find no absolute bar in Article III to suits by federal taxpayers challenging allegedly unconstitutional federal taxing and spending programs. ”

“ Thus, no justiciable controversy is presented when the parties seek adjudication of only a political question, [10] when the parties are asking for an advisory opinion, [11] when the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments, [12] and when there is no standing to maintain the action. [13] Yet it remains true that ' (j) usticiability is * * * not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification. ”

“ The premise for this argument is apparently that, under 20 U.S.C. § 241e, programs of local educational agencies require only the direct approval of state officials to be eligible for grants. However, appellees are given broad powers of supervision over state participation by 20 U.S.C. § 241f, and it is federal funds administered by appellees that finance the local programs. We cannot characterize such federal participation as 'remote.'↑ An additional requirement for the convening of a three-judge court is that the constitutional question presented be substantial. ”

“ It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute. This requirement is consistent with the limitation imposed upon state-taxpayer standing in federal courts in Doremus v. ”