Summary

Portrait of F. H. Bradley F. H. Bradley Ethical Studies — Note to Essay II. (1876)

To say ‘thoughts of what is and is to be, exist in you, are in your head, and then you carry them out, and that is action,’ is futile; because these thoughts, if desired, are not merely in me, they are felt to be mine, ideally to be myself, and, when they are carried out, that therefore is self-realization.
Or shall we be told that ‘to talk of carrying out is nonsense. In action we produce changes in things and in ourselves, answering to thoughts: things resemble thoughts, but, strictly speaking, thought is not realized, because that is unmeaning’?
Source: Wikisource

Portrait of F. H. Bradley F. H. Bradley Ethical Studies — Note to Essay II. (1876)

It is clear that, on the one side, selves do exclude one another. I am not you, you are not he; and, resting on this notion of exclusiveness, we go on to look at the self as a repellent point, or, as we call it, a mere individual. But, apart from metaphysics, facts soon compel us to see that this is not a reality, but an abstraction of our minds. For, without troubling ourselves about the relation of one person to others, as soon as we imagine this mere ‘individual’ acting, we see he must bring forth something, and, to do that, must have something in him, must have a content
Source: Wikisource

Portrait of F. H. Bradley F. H. Bradley Ethical Studies — Note to Essay II. (1876)

Well then, just as we must accept the teaching that ‘all is relative to self,’ but supplement and correct it with the teaching that ‘myself also is relative’; so we must accept the teaching of the selfish theory that I can will myself only, but correct it by the addition ‘and yet the self which is myself, which is mine, is not merely me.’ Hence that all willing is self-realization is seen not to be in collision with morality.
Source: Wikisource

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