Summary

Portrait of Jill Anne Pryor Jill Anne Pryor Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St… (2022)

To start, the majority opinion simply declares—without any basis—that a person’s “biological sex” is comprised solely of chromosomal structure and birth-assigned sex. So, the majority opinion concludes, a person’s gender identity has no bearing on this case about equal protection for a transgender boy. The majority opinion does so in disregard of the record evidence—evidence the majority does not contest—which demonstrates that gender identity is an immutable, biological component of a person’s sex.
Source: Wikisource

Portrait of Jill Anne Pryor Jill Anne Pryor Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St… (2022)

As to equal protection claims by transgender students, the facts unique to each case will determine whether a school district has met its burden under heightened scrutiny. And with respect to Title IX claims, the fact that sex is a but-for cause of differential treatment does not necessarily mean that actionable discrimination exists. Our law, both constitutional law and statutes and regulations, recognizes a legitimate, protectible privacy interest in the practice of separating bathroom facilities by sex.
Source: Wikisource

Portrait of Jill Anne Pryor Jill Anne Pryor Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St… (2022)

Like the Fourth Circuit in Grimm, I have no trouble concluding that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class. Adams’s transgender status provides an alternative reason why heightened scrutiny applies.
3. The Policy Does Not Survive Heightened Scrutiny. I turn now to why the School District’s bathroom policy fails heightened scrutiny. Under the heightened scrutiny test, a sex classification “fails unless it is substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest.”
Source: Wikisource

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