John Paul Stevens

“ Section 3142 (e) recognizes that certain characteristics of the offense or arrestee may support a rebuttable presumption that no conditions of release exist, but such a presumption arises only "if such judicial officer finds" that those conditions do exist. (Emphasis added.) The magistrate's say-so cannot make his reasoning any less of a bootstrap. A late detention hearing does not become permissible on the basis of a presumption that cannot exist until after the hearing is held. ”

“ Congress carefully prescribed stringent procedures to govern this extraordinary departure from the guarantee of liberty normally accorded to presumptively innocent individuals. [6] Accordingly, when this Court upheld the constitutionality of these provisions of the Bail Reform Act, it assumed that pretrial detention would be imposed only on those arrestees "found after an adversary hearing to pose a threat . . . which no condition of release can dispel. The numerous procedural safeguards detailed above must attend this adversary hearing." ”

“ The Court apparently discards the possibility that the hearing might result in a determination that the arrestee is eligible for release-as the Magistrate so determined in this case-or that detention of any arrestee before establishing the legality of that intrusion on liberty could "affect substantial rights." 876 F.2d 826, 829 (CA10 1989) ; Fed. Rule Crim.Proc. 52 (a) . A harmless-error analysis fails to appreciate the gravity of the deprivation of liberty that physical detention imposes and the reality that " [r] elief in this type of case must be speedy if it is to be effective." ”

“ It held that laws "intended for the protection of the citizen, and to prevent a sacrifice of his property, and by a disregard of which his rights might be and generally would be injuriously affected, . ”