Summary

Joseph McKenna Fullinwider v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company of California…

Not the conditions of the act of 1866 are imposed on the grant, but the conditions imposed by section 9, conditions upon a different grant and a different company, is the contention, though complainant admits that—
'There is no question but that the language of section 23 segregated from the act, of which it is a part, and construed alone, supports the contention of the appellees.'
The language gains, we think, not loses in strength from its location. It makes evident that there was a conscious contrast of provision between the grants and the companies.
Source: Wikisource

Joseph McKenna Fullinwider v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company of California…

And the policy dictated, it is said, the provision of section 9 of the grants to the Texas Pacific Railroad Company, and determines the insertion of a like provision in section 23 which concerns the grant to the Southern Pacific Company, though it is not inserted therein. We may grant, if a policy exists, that it may be used to resolve the uncertainty of a law, but it cannot be a substitute for a law. However, we do not find the uncertainty in sections 9 or 23 that complainant does, whether jointly or separately considered. Section 23 is complete in itself.
Source: Wikisource

Joseph McKenna Fullinwider v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company of California…

Complainant's argument in support of the answer does not submit easily to succinct statement. Its postulate is that the policy of Congress in regard to the public lands came to have its chief solicitude in the disposition of them to actual settlers at reasonable prices and that this policy was not overlooked even in the grants to railroads.
Source: Wikisource

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