Louis Brandeis

“ Thus the aims which induced Congress to enact sections 327 and 328, the nature of the task which it confided to the Commissioner, the methods of procedure prescribed, and the language employed to express the conditions under which the special assessment is required, all negative the right to a review of his determination by a court.
It is true that where the Commissioner's action is rviewable judicially, his findings of fact in making an assessment, as distinguished from his determinations involving administrative discretion, constitute only prima facie evidence ”

“ Congress did not, by the Revenue Act of 1918 (40 Stat. 1057) , require the Commissioner to embody the results of his deliberation in findings of fact. The purpose of the meagre record prescribed by section 328 (c) in case the Commissioner concludes to order a special assessment is apparently to protect the Treasury, not the taxpayer. [6] For, if the Commissioner refuses to make the special assessment, he is not required to state the grounds of his refusal, or indeed, even to record the fact of such refusal. ”

“ But such problems involve primarily the situation of a single taxpayer, and the controlling data can easily be made available to the court. Here the considerations which demand special assessment under section 327 (d) and those which govern its computation in all cases, are facts concerning the situation of a large group of taxpayers which can only be known to an official or a body having wide experience in such matters and ready access to the means of information.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, if any, rests on statutory provisions which long antedate the Revenue Act of 1918. ”