Supreme Court of the United States

“ The majority professes interest in “efficiency.” Ibid. But forcing district court proceedings to a halt—for months or years while the appeal runs its course—is itself inefficient. The majority also fears losing other “asserted benefits of arbitration” without a stay. Ibid. But with a stay, the party opposing arbitration loses the benefits of immediate litigation. A plaintiff’s request for injunctive protection against imminent harm, for example, goes unanswered under the majority’s rule. ”

“ All agree that an interlocutory appeal should trigger a stay if that standard is met. But the majority goes further and requires a stay in all cases. Indeed, the majority mandates a stay even if none of the traditional stay prerequisites are present: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, favorable balance of equities, and alignment with the public interest. ”

“ Even setting all that aside, the majority opinion’s reliance on a “background” rule, ante, at 3, still fails. The majority has not shown that its own rule (the mandatory-general-stay rule) existed as a background matter when Congress enacted §16 in 1988. Indeed, the majority opinion does not identify a single case in which this Court imposed a mandatory general stay of pre-trial and trial proceedings pending an interlocutory appeal. Not in an arbitration case. Not in an analogous case about the proper adjudicatory forum for a dispute. Not in any interlocutory appeal at all. ”

“ At the end of the day, the best the majority can do is point to a smattering of provisions that do not contain the rule that the majority adopts. And those provisions do not even relate to §16 or the majority’s rule (staying litigation generally but not proceedings on costs and fees) . Neither those statutes, nor any other, imposes on arbitrability appeals the stay rule that the Court announces. ”

“ Fourth, Bielski suggests that there is no need for an automatic stay because the ordinary discretionary stay factors would adequately protect parties’ rights to an interlocutory appellate determination of arbitrability. To begin with, experience shows that Bielski is incorrect. District courts and courts of appeals applying the usual four-factor standard for a discretionary stay often deny stays in §16 (a) appeals because courts applying that test often do not consider litigation-related burdens (here, from the continued District Court proceedings) to constitute irreparable harm. ”

“ That potential for coercion is especially pronounced in class actions, where the possibility of colossal liability can lead to what Judge Friendly called “blackmail settlements.” H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 120 (1973) . ”

“ Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248, 254 (1936) . That power is discretionary—it “calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests” in each particular case. Id., at 254–255. ”