Thurgood Marshall

“ Thus, § 502 (b) (1) contemplates circumstances in which a "claim," like the mortgage lien that passes through a Chapter 7 proceeding, may consist of nothing more than an obligation enforceable against the debtor's property. Similarly, § 102 (2) establishes, as a " [r] ul [e] of construction," that the phrase " 'claim against the debtor' includes claim against property of the debtor." A fair reading of § 102 (2) is that a creditor who, like the Bank in this case, has a claim enforceable only against the debtor's property nonetheless has a "claim against the debtor" for purposes of the Code. ”

“ Any or all of these provisions may be implicated when a debtor files serially under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. But given the availability of these provisions, and given Congress' intent that "claim" be construed broadly, we do not believe that Congress intended the bankruptcy courts to use the Code's definition of "claim" to police the Chapter 13 process for abuse.
The Bank renews here its claim that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding petitioner's plan to be in good faith for purposes of § 1325 (a) (3) and feasible for purposes of § 1325 (a) (6) of the Code. ”

“ We have previously explained that Congress intended by this language to adopt the broadest available definition of "claim." See Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. ----, ----, ----, 110 S.Ct. 2126, ----, ----, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 (1990) ; see also Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 279, 105 S.Ct. 705, 707, 83 L.Ed.2d 649 (1985) . In Davenport, we concluded that " 'right to payment' [means] nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation. . . ." ”