Thurgood Marshall

“ Mere place of residence, or any other factor closely related to race, should not be regarded as a legitimate basis for exercising peremptory challenges without some corroboration on voir dire that the challenged venirepersons actually entertain the bias underlying the use of that factor. This is true particularly when, as in this case, the prosecutor can easily ascertain the existence of the alleged bias without use of the overly broad proxy for bias. To hold otherwise would render Batson's protections against race discrimination in jury selection illusory. ”

“ Accordingly, I would find that the prosecutor's uncorroborated suspicions of bias on the part of two challenged venirepersons insufficient to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination in this case. A Batson violation occurs when a prosecutor strikes any juror on the basis of race. ”

“ Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2973, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) , I would grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case. ”