Summary

Thurgood Marshall Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission…

Insofar as Congress did not invest the Commission with the power to make law or policy by other means, we cannot infer that Congress expected the Commission to use its adjudicatory power to play a policymaking role. Moreover, when a traditional, unitary agency uses adjudication to engage in lawmaking by regulatory interpretation, it necessarily interprets regulations that it has promulgated.
Source: Wikisource

Thurgood Marshall Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission…

We harbor no doubt that Congress also intended to protect regulated parties from biased interpretations of the Secretary's regulations. But this objective is achieved when the Commission, and ultimately the court of appeals, review the Secretary's interpretation to assure that it is consistent with the regulatory language and is otherwise reasonable. Giving the Commission the power to substitute its reasonable interpretations for the Secretary's might slightly increase regulated parties' protection from overzealous interpretations.
Source: Wikisource

Thurgood Marshall Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission…

Because applying an agency's regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency's unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the agency's delegated lawmaking powers. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566, 568, 100 S.Ct. 790, 797, 798, 63 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980) . The question before us in this case is to which administrative actor-the Secretary or the Commission-did Congress delegate this "interpretive" lawmaking power under the OSH Act.
Source: Wikisource

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