W. Balck

“ Its main strength lies in steadily delivered fire, while cavalry relies on the possibility of making an unexpected rapid charge, on quickly covering great distances, and on the moral effect which its irresistible onslaught undoubtedly produces upon infantry. So long as there is a possibility of surprise and misunderstanding, of infantry allowing itself to become discouraged, and of the individual soldier being exposed to hunger and hardships, so long will cavalry that is energetically led be able to gain brilliant victories. ”

“ Thiers, the French historian, instead of seeking to define strategy and tactics, contents himself with explaining the problems of each: “Le stratège doit concevoir le plan de campagne, embrasser d’un seul coup d’oeil tout le théatre présumé de la guerre, tracer lignes d’opérations et diriger les masses sur les points décisifs. Le tacticien a pour mission de régler l’ordre de leurs marches, de les disposer en bataille aux différents points, indiqués par le stratège, d’engager l’action, de la soutenir et de manoeuvrer pour atteindre le but proposé.” ”

“ The importance of drill, which cannot be replaced by anything else, does not become apparent until all enthusiasm disappears, until the leader becomes conscious of the specter of panic which stalks by the side of enthusiasm.
“Discipline,” says Archduke John in his well-known work Drill or Training, “must not be confounded with the snappy drill of troops, and can, moreover, not be attained by means of it. The straightjacket has never yet cured one insane person; the soul cannot be disciplined through the body. One must work from the inside and not from the outside. ”

“ Infantry acting alone therefore unquestionably requires the assignment of mounted men for reconnaissance and messenger duty. As regards reconnaissance, infantry is like a man walking in the dark, who can guard against collisions only by stretching out his hand and feeling his way.
The lack of artillery support will also make itself felt when infantry encounters fire at ranges at which it is defenseless, owing to the limited range of its rifle. Infantry cannot dispense with artillery when it has to attack localities or fortified points in villages. ”

“ Troops will be able to find a way out of such situations only if they have been taught to follow the spirit rather than the letter of their regulations, if they have been individually trained and accustomed to strict discipline, and if their leaders have been taught to reflect on tactics. It is better to send troops into battle with the order, “Help yourselves as best you can,” than to encumber them with combat rules of doubtful value which leave them in the lurch at the first opportunity, because the troops have not been taught to depend upon their own initiative. ”

“ While everything is orderly and in readiness in the defender’s firing line, the attacker’s line is still in the process of forming. Should the defender wait until the hostile firing line has systematically deployed and has made a lodgment within short range of his position, or should he produce losses and create confusion in its ranks by suddenly opening fire?
The employment of long range fire on the defensive is justified when sufficient ammunition is available, when artillery is not present, and when the hostile infantry pursues the tactics of advancing to short range without firing. ”

“ Infantry is as well adapted for combat with firearms as for combat with the bayonet, for attack as for defense, for action in close as in extended order. It can fight on any terrain which is at all passable, and is more independent of weather and seasons than the other arms; it surpasses the other arms in endurance, a man, on account of his will power, bearing privations and exertions better than a horse. ”

“ The selection of a point of attack is essentially the personal task of the commander and is an index of character and of eye for the value of ground, neither of which can be regulated by fixed rules. The regulations do not believe that close order formations can be dispensed with in launching the assaulting troops. Troops in close order, utilizing the ground to the best advantage, so as to suffer but slight losses from hostile fire, are to be brought up to the fighting line in a flexible echelon formation in order to give to that line, as troupes d’assaut, the impetus for the assault. ”

“ If, in addition, an officer has been allowed, in time of peace, to criticise, from the start, an order of his superior with reference to its feasibility, it may easily happen in the stern reality of actual war that a subordinate leader, neither especially courageous nor ambitious, succumbs to the seductive whisperings of his senses on the approach of danger and sees in caution the better part of valor. ”

“ The proper sphere of machine guns lies in their employment as a separate arm, whether they are posted so as to flank an enemy, or are kept at the disposal of the commander as an ever ready reserve, which is pushed forward to keep the point to be attacked under fire, to meet a counter-attack, or—and to this use they are best adapted—to participate in the pursuit. Their employment is also proper in rear guard actions, since they are able to remain in position longer, for example, than rear guard infantry, whose energies are paralyzed by the thought of getting away from the enemy in time. ”

“ Distribution in depth is, therefore, only a means to an end; an expedient made use of to maintain a dense firing line permanently at a constant strength; to give the firing line the impetus for the assault; to protect it against a reverse; and to secure its flanks. Victory is assured only by the simultaneous employment of superior fighting forces. A force should go into action in a deep combat formation, but it must extend its front during the fight. ”

“ In England it was decided to form mounted infantry charged with the additional duty of augmenting the fire of a cavalry division, and of furnishing the commander-in-chief with a reserve possessing the requisite mobility to permit its being thrown to any threatened point of the long battle lines of today. But of what importance is the fire of a single battalion in the large armies of the present day? The principal drawback to the employment of mounted infantry is, however, that, when mounted, it is defenseless against cavalry, and that, while in motion, it really needs a supporting force. ”

“ When a body of troops intrenches during an attack, it must detach half of its force to keep up the attack; this cannot be offset by an increased rate of fire, even if squad leaders, range finders, and musicians, take part in the fight, as the men offer a taller target while intrenching, and as the newly turned earth facilitates the enemy’s aim. ”

“ It would seem desirable to surround the enemy’s zone of approach, or the position one wishes to attack, from the very outset with a dense, continuous line of rifles, and to overcome the resistance of the enemy in the earliest phases of the combat by means of an overwhelming volume of fire from as many rifles as possible. The impediments that stand in the way of carrying out this idea lie in the terrain, the ignorance of the enemy’s position, and in human nature. The defender can be driven from his position only by an attack; the impulse for an advance must be given by fresh troops ”

“ Infantry, no matter in what formation it may happen to be, has nothing to fear from hostile cavalry, even if the latter is in superior numbers, provided the infantry remains cool, well in hand, and makes good use of its fire.
When cavalry surprises infantry, the effect is as great as of old. Infantry should therefore carefully protect itself in all situations of combat, especially during critical moments.
If cavalry is reported, infantry can guard against all contingencies by echeloning. It should not allow itself to be diverted from its task so long as the cavalry does not begin an attack. ”

“ Insufficient reconnaissance may place a force in a situation where it will be obliged to go into action directly from route column or from a formation unsuitable for combat, against an enemy who unexpectedly opens a lively fire at short range, thus increasing the moral effect of the surprise by actually inflicting losses. The force which is taken by surprise will without doubt overrate the seriousness of the situation and will be inclined to overestimate the strength and morale of the opposing force. ”

“ Moreover, the duration of a combat, and, in conjunction therewith, the necessity of reinforcing the firing line and covering the flanks, increases with the size of the force. During protracted periods of peace, one is too much inclined to underestimate the wastefulness of a battle and the necessity for reinforcing the fighting line; one cannot understand why 5 to 6 men will not suffice, during the course of a combat, for a front wherein only one man can use his rifle. From the foregoing it follows that the frontage does not increase in proportion to the number of men. ”

“ The assault does not, strictly speaking, belong to the domain of tactics. Rules, showing in what formations and under what conditions the assault should be made in war, cannot be formulated. At any rate, fire tactics are not only an essential factor but also the crowning act of combat; the assault is nothing but the postlude. All modern combats show that the morale of the men suffers most, and that, in consequence thereof, troops deteriorate quickly when they are exposed to the annihilating effect of fire. ”

“ He makes a distinction between battle-tactics and the tactics of detachment warfare. In his opinion, the sum of the local successes can by no means gain the victory; that can only be done by the united launching of adequate forces at the decisive point. “No weapon in the world will ever alter the fact that five battalions united in one body have a greater inherent fighting power than five separate battalions—not to mention twenty separate companies—always provided that a united body of troops is also launched as one body.” ”

“ Military history moreover enables us to appreciate those controlling [8] factors which, in map problems, do not appear at all, and which, in exercises on the terrain, appear only in a restricted measure. One must learn the conduct of war from the experience of others; one’s own experience is costly and is almost invariably gained too late. That experience in war, of itself, is not sufficient (aside from the fact that it is gained too late in a given case) is illustrated by the defeat of the Austrians in 1866, of the French in 1870-71, and of the British in South Africa. ”

“ If the assault is not made at this moment, the crisis may pass, but a determined rush by the attacker will, as a rule, bring about the decision. The threat of a bayonet attack usually decides those who have remained in the position, to make no further resistance. The attacker must make use of the moral factors in an assault, hence the importance of running, cheering, and accompanying the advance of all bodies in close order by the beating of drums and the sounding of trumpets. ”

“ For enthusiasm, we would substitute faithful, unselfish performance of duty, and unquestioning subordination of the will of the individual to that of the leader. To be sure, on days of success enthusiasm will suffice, but not when everything around us begins to waver and to yield. ”

“ For examples from military history consult the splendid works of Major Kunz, especially Die deutsche Reiterei, and Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele, 5.
The individual infantryman whose rifle is loaded and who knows how to use his bayonet is more than a match for the individual mounted man even on open ground; and, if he remains cool, retains his presence of mind, and uses his rifle properly while keeping the opponent constantly in view, he is even superior to several mounted men. Infantry which retains its steadiness has nothing to fear even when outnumbered by cavalry. ”

“ The system of united action seeks to ensure victory by simultaneously placing in readiness all the forces intended for the general combat, by an orderly concentration for action, and by launching the troops at one and the same time, without, however, requiring all parts of the force to employ the same formations. This system dictates to the leader the number of troops he should launch. Since in action everything is ordered as necessity therefor arises, the result is that the leader loses sight of the general action in view of the great number of separate orders that must be issued. ”

“ As no assault was made, no opportunity was offered the defender for using his rifles against targets the height of a man. The British infantrymen were, however, insufficiently trained in handling their weapons independently. As to rise and to retreat meant annihilation, the determination to resist weakened gradually during the long fire fight, and, in order to escape from this seemingly unendurable situation, which grew more and more acute with every minute, and which paralyzed every energetic decision, one avenue of escape only seemed open, that of surrender. ”

“ DRILL REGULATIONS.
Drill regulations are the accumulation of the tactical views and lessons of a certain period. They illustrate the tactical condition which becomes perceptible at the moment of a certain development of the fighting tools as represented by man and weapons. Man, in his peculiarities, in his weaknesses, is the constant. He constitutes the psychological element, inseparable from the science of combat, and as such is the definitely given magnitude; the effect of weapons, however, appears always as the variable factor. New weapons, therefore, necessitate new tactics. ”

“ It is true that strategy, by directing the armies and their concentration on the battlefield, provides tactics with the tools for fighting and assures the probability of victory; but, on the other hand, the commander-in-chief appropriates the fruits of each victory and makes them the basis for further plans. “The demands of strategy are silent in the presence of tactical victory; they adapt themselves to the newly created situation.” Fieldmarshal Moltke. ”

“ The Russo-Japanese war confirms the opinion that the issue of combat is but little influenced by the formations taken up; that esprit and the determination to conquer are of far greater importance than any formation. The most difficult task that infantry can be called upon to perform consists of successfully pushing home an attack over open ground commanded by hostile fire. “It would be wrong,” said Fieldmarshal Moltke, “were one to attempt to lay down in regulations that a force should not advance over a plain against an enemy under cover. ”

“ Let us assume that there exists an army which bases success in battle on fire action, and takes for granted that the enemy will not be able to get near enough to make a bayonet attack. If this army were to encounter another army which, without undervaluing the effect of fire, remembers the bayonet at the proper time, it would be filled with the most dreadful dismay when the enemy actually assails it with the bayonet. ”

“ From a consideration of the foregoing, it appears that the maximum frontage is justifiable, when a force whose flanks are secure, occupies a position prepared for defense, or acts as a reserve and is to bring about a decision which has been prepared by other troops. On the other hand, the maximum distribution in depth is necessary for a force acting alone in attack with both flanks exposed. Between these two extremes lie many intermediate degrees, and it is therefore impossible to lay down hard and fast rules for the frontage of an attacking force. ”

“ The fire power of the troops in the holding attack must not be exhausted, or the troops themselves defeated by a hostile counter-attack, before the moment of the general advance arrives. They must pay the strictest attention to the course of events on the opponent’s side; if the enemy retires, or shifts parts of his force in order to meet a flank attack, the troops in the holding attack must act with energy. If such signs are not apparent, a frontal advance will, as a rule, be proper only when the pressure of the flank attack makes itself felt on the enemy’s line. ”

“ The following is taken from a private letter of Sir Ian Hamilton, perhaps the foremost British infantry tactician, who had the good fortune, at Elandslaagte and Doornkop, of leading his command close up to the enemy: “It is my opinion that no matter what regulations are promulgated in time of peace, the men will fire during the assault. You may rest assured that nothing will prevent their doing this. One would do well, therefore, to reckon with this factor from the very start. The greatest danger is always that the men will throw themselves down instead of continuing the advance. ”

“ Fire discipline is indispensable to fire control and fire direction. It embraces the conscientious execution of all orders and signals, as well as the scrupulous observation of all regulations bearing on the handling of the rifle and on combat in general. Fire discipline must be maintained even though the fire control and fire direction exercised by the leaders is imperfect or ceases entirely in the course of the action. ”

“ Whether an organization is thoroughly trained and disciplined is best shown in extended order fighting, for, as the direct control of the leader on his command decreases, the demands made on the initiative of the individual soldier increase out of all proportion. It is at any rate more practical to develop this initiative than to try to prevent the disorganizing effect of combat by restricting the personal freedom of the individual soldier. ”

“ In covered terrain, the effect of the surprise will be increased still more, while in open country, the preparatory stage of the combat will soon lose that character, because the side which has an advantage as regards terrain will make use of it, and the conviction will force itself upon the opponent that victory cannot be gained by an impetuous attack alone. It will be easy for a commander to come to a decision as to the action to be taken if he is conscious of his own strength or fears that the enemy desires to avoid an attack. ”