W. Keith Hancock and Margaret M. Gowing

“ Plans for building the war economy on and Allied bases were limited in the main to some rather restricted agreements in the sphere of overseas supply and purchase. Practically no attempts were made to integrate and balance the national armament plans: each country had its own types of weapons and aircraft, its own production programs, its own conceptions about the mobilisation of manpower, materials and plant. As regards overseas purchase of additional weapons, neither country fought itself able to do very much; but the French were preparing to do more than the British. ”

“ Expansion of Anglo-French timber production from 51⁄2 to 111⁄2 million tons. This plan had symbolical significance. Its basic principle was the maximum expansion import-saving production at home in order to achieve the maximum economy of shipping. Simultaneously, it expressed the new determination of both Governments to spend their dollars in ways that would save their ships; for the programme of home production would not be achieved without large importations of North American machinery to expedite the felling of French and British forests. ”

“ For oil, both France and Britain were equally dependent upon imports from overseas; for coal France would be especially dependent upon imports from Britain, once her large supplies from Germany and Poland were cut off. There seemed no cause for misgiving about the availability in overseas countries of ample supplies of oil and petroleum products—with the possible exception of aviation spirit. Nor were there at that time any misgivings about the capacity of British coal-fields to satisfy to the full the expanded requirements of France. ”

“ The French reluctantly accepted this arrangement, which made them in large measure dependent upon their ally. The dependence might not after all matter very much, if their ally’s forecasts of abundance were true. In the faith that the forecasts were true, French departments, like British ones, were expansive and vague in their estimates of requirements. The statistical bases of a scientific import programme will not worked out in Britain; still less were they worked out in France. In consequence, they could not be worked out for Britain and France in combination. ”

“ On the economic side it was harder to make a start; for no authority had been established is yet to make plans for the Anglo-French economic effort as a whole. The deficiencies of piecemeal and partial departmental preparations soon made themselves felt. Those multitudinous difficulties that arose from the unforeseen shipping shortage imposed upon the alliance precisely the same strains as it imposed on British departments. Indeed, for the French the strains were harder to bear. ”

“ Admittedly, there was plenty of room for more economical use of machine tools in American industry; but should the Allies decide to increase their demand for aircraft and other finished implements of war, a genuine shortage would make itself felt until such time as the Americans created new productive capacity. The shortage might very quickly become critical should the Americans simultaneously enlarge and speed up their own rearmament. ”

“ Each executive within its own sphere was expected to survey the requirements of the two countries and to make an inventory of their resources: to secure the best use of those resources on the common interest: to formulate joint import programmes, and under these programmes so to organise purchases as to eliminate competition between the Allied nations. Every executive which had responsibilities of importation was instructed to adjust its programmes to the limitations of 'cash' and 'carry', and in particular to maintain close contact with the Shipping Executive. ”

“ Since the alliance was bound to be just as strong or as weak as the national machinery permitted it to be, the search for inter-Allied efficiency became intermingled—then as later—with the search for national efficiency. For that reason alone, if for no other, many responsible persons in British government service welcome the strong drive that came very soon from the French, and in particular from M. Jean Monnet, a veteran of international economic planning both in the First World War and during the period of Genevan peace. Monnet had the ear of the French Prime Minister ”

“ The procurement of food, raw materials and all other overseas imports raised the crucial problems of foreign exchange and shipping. Inter-Allied plans for handling these problems could not possibly be more efficacious the national plans; for in the approaching war as in the past, executive action would be the responsibility of the national governments, and the inter-Allied planning authorities could not efficiently perform their task of focusing the essential issues and recommending action unless the national administration supplied them with exact and relevant information. ”

“ According to the estimate, British imports during the first six months of the war had been falling short of requirements by approximately one seventh, while French requirements had been falling short by one half. It was hardly to be wondered that M. Daladier should challenge the whole basis of Allied import policy. In a communication addressed to Mr Chamberlain on 31st March, he proposed the following order an import priorities: coal, aircraft, armaments and materials, food. Coal, which came first on the French Prime Minister's list, represented the largest need of France ”

“ He was however quick to perceive the compensating potentialities of the Anglo-French Co-ordinating Committee, and in particular its office of chairman. The British were perhaps contemplating a joint committee of their usual inter-departmental pattern—to arrange and adjust the policies that originated elsewhere, not to initiate policies of its own. The French were determined—which means that Monnet was determined—to entrust to the chairman of the combined organisation a definite role of leadership, planning an organisation. They were also determined to secure for France the office of chairman. ”

“ During the winter months, this failure had been largely due to an unpredicted shortage of coastal ships and to the dislocation of transport caused by the severe weather; but by the early spring, whether sufficiency of shipping had been at last assembled, an insufficiency of coal was for the first time revealed. Soon there followed those hectic week of crisis in which German armies overran the eastern coalfields and French requirements upon Britain rose to the level of 21⁄2 million tons a month. The British made extraordinary efforts to help: in May they shipped to France 1,814,000 tons. ”

“ No muddle was ever greater than the timber muddle. In September 1939, at least three British departments sent agents to France and neighbouring countries to bid for timber. Not one of these agents established satisfactory relationships with the various French authorities that had a producer or user interest in timber. The French, on their side, expressed themselves unable to meet even the requirements of the British Expeditionary Force; their department of Eaux et Forêt was anxious about stocks but had no programme for increasing or even maintaining production ”

“ At the same time, both countries were preoccupied with the market prospects of food produces in their colonial dependencies. Even before Munich, the visit of a French mission to the Food (Defence Plans) Department had resulted in a fairly comprehensive agreement—a joint food committee to be set up in London: coordinated purchasing of cereals, frozen meat, pulses, sugar and cocoa: joint purchasing missions in the chief neutral countries: each country, in its own colonial territories, to make all necessary purchases on behalf of its ally. ”

“ It was essential that the claims of the belligerent democracies should be comprehensively and precisely stated; otherwise they might be swept off the board when the neutral democracy of America made up its mind to vote funds for a large-scale expansion of its own fighting services. Mr. Morgenthau, Secretary to the Treasury, repeatedly warned Purvis of these dangers and repeatedly pressed him for a complete statement covering all Allied requirements. Purvis, in his turn, put persistent pressure upon his masters at home. ”

“ A common balance sheet of requirements and resources based on exact statistical data contributed by each ally. Strongly inter-Allied the executive committees to deal with the main problems of supply and the governing factors of finance and shipping. A series of policy committees or 'councils', composed in each instance of one British and one French minister, to direct the work of the executive committees. An Economic Council, composed possibly of one British and one French minister, to give overall economic direction. ”

“ As has been explained in a previous chapter, [1] that machinery had at its apex the Supreme War Council, which was constituted by the Prime Ministers and one other minister from each participating nation and their official advisers. ”