William J. Brennan

“ It is his sole responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Art. II, § 3. Here, as previously noted, President Carter has represented to this Court through the Solicitor General that the Act is consistent with "the effective discharge of the President's powers:"
"Far from constituting a breach of executive autonomy, the Act . . . is an appropriate means of ensuring that the Executive Branch will have access to the materials necessary to the performance of its duties." ”

“ While the incumbent President has supported the constitutionality of the Act as it is written, there is no indication that he will oppose appellant's assertions of Presidential privilege as they relate to the rules that will govern the screening process and the timing of disclosure, and particularly the restrictions that may be placed on certain documents and recordings. ”

“ I agree with the Court that, even in the councils of Government, an individual "has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal communications," ante at [433 U.S. 425#465 433 U.S. 465] , and also that compelled disclosure of an individual's political associations, in and out of Government, can be justified only by "a compelling public need that cannot be met in a less restrictive way," ante at [433 U.S. 425#467 433 U.S. 467] . Today's decision is limited to the facial validity of the Act's provisions for retention and screening of the materials. ”

“ In these circumstances, I believe it is appropriate to address appellant's constitutional claims, as did the District Court, with an eye toward the kind of regulations and screening practices that would be consistent with the Act and yet that would afford protection to the important constitutional interests asserted. Section 104 (a) (5) of the Act directs the Administrator to take into account
"the need to protect any party's opportunity to assert any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege which would prevent or otherwise limit access to such recordings and materials." ”

“ And last Term we reaffirmed the fundamental principle that the appointment of executive officers is an "Executive" function that Congress is without power to vest in itself. Buckley v. Valeo, supra at [/us/424/1/case.html#124 424 U.S. 124] -141. But the Act before us presumptively avoids these difficulties by entrusting the task of ensuring that its provisions are faithfully executed to an officer of the Executive Branch. ”

“ These arguments undoubtedly have considerable force, but I do not think they can support a decision invalidating this Act on its face. Section 1 of Art. II vests all of the executive power in the sitting President, and limits his term of office to four years. ”