President of the United States Senate

“ Your Senate is appointed directly by the State Legislatures. Your President and House of Representatives, indirectly, by the same authority. Suppose they should neglect or refuse to make these appointments, can you compel them to do it? No, sir. Can you punish them for not doing it? Not in the least. They may appoint or not, as they think proper; and if they should neglect or refuse to do it, your boasted complete Government would die a natural death, by its own imbecility. It is not fair, then, to say that a power is constitutional, because the Government would be incomplete without it. ”

“ The tendency of the Senate is constantly to encroach,—not only upon the jurisdiction of the House, but upon the rights of the Chief Executive of the nation. The power of confirming appointments is rapidly becoming a means by which the Senate dictates appointments. The Constitution gives to the President the initiative in appointments, as it gives to the House the initiative in revenue legislation. ”

“ I hope we can strengthen it further in the Senate. What we can't do is drag our feet or delay much longer. The American people expect us to act, and that's exactly what I intend to do as President of the United States. ”

“ The United States Senate does not work that way, nor can it, or should it.
Mayors, governors, and presidents can sometimes succeed by the sheer force of their will. But there has never been a Senator so persuasive, so charismatic, so clever, or so brilliant that they could make a significant difference, while refusing to work with other members of this body.
Simply put, Mr. President, Senators cannot ultimately be effective alone. ”

“ In England the king has a power to create members of the upper house, who are judges in the highest court, as well as legislators. Our President not only cannot make members of the Senate, but their creation, like his own, is by the people, through their representatives: and a member of Assembly may and will be as certainly dismissed at the end of his year, for electing a weak or wicked Senator, as for any other blunder or misconduct. ”

“ A senator of great influence will be naturally ambitious, and desirous of increasing his influence. Will he not be under a temptation to use his influence with the president, as well as his brother senators, to appoint persons to office in the several states, who will exert themselves in elections to get out his enemies or opposers, both in senate and house of representatives, and to get in his friends, perhaps his instruments? ”

“ As the President is to be taken from the Senate, and, if worthy of the Senatorial office, must have experience, and be well informed of the affairs of the nation—and can also avail himself of the information and talents of every member of the Government—there can be no solid objection to reducing his term of service to one year. The President will always enter on his office at the close of the session of Congress ”

“ We have seen that the late honorable convention, in designating the nature of the chief executive office of the United States, having deprived it of all the dangerous appendages of royalty, and provided for the frequent expiration of its limited powers—As our president bears no resemblance to a king, so we shall see the senate have no similitude to nobles. ”

“ The senate must always receive the exceptions of the president against any of their legislative acts, which, without [12] serious deliberation and sufficient reasons, they will seldom disregard. They will also feel a considerable check from the constitutional powers of the state legislatures, whose rights they will not be disposed to infringe, since they are the bodies to which they owe their existence, and are moreover to remain the immediate guardians of the people. ”

“ It is certain, that the senate cannot, by their refusal to confirm the nominations of the president, prevent him from the proper discharge of his duty. The most, that can be suggested, is, that they may induce him to yield to their favourites, instead of his own, by resisting his nominations. But if this should happen in a few rare instances, it is obvious, that his means of influence would ordinarily form a counter check. The power, which can originate the disposal of honours and emoluments, is more likely to attract, than to be attracted by the power, which can merely obstruct their course. ”

“ The people will also be jealous, that the influence of the senate will be employed to conceal, connive, and defend guilt in executive officers, instead of being a guard and watch upon them, and a terror to them—a council selected by the president himself, at his pleasure, from among the senators, representatives, and nation at large, would be purely responsible—in that case, the senate, as a body, would not be compromised. ”

“ Why, that we are not to be governed by the information or opinion of others, however well acquainted with the subject; we are so self-sufficient as to disregard the best lights which can be presented to us. The cry is up to the hub, down with the bank, huzza for the party! So long, Mr. President, as I shall be honored with a seat in the Senate of the Union, I am determined to respect my station and my own feelings and character too much to be driven along by any such idle, ridiculous clamor. ”

“ A president will rarely want means, if he shall choose to use them, to induce some members of such a body to aid his nominations; since a correspondent influence may be fairly presumed to exist, to gratify such persons in other recommendations for office, and thus to make them indirectly the dispensers of local patronage. It will be, principally, with regard to high officers, such as ambassadors, judges, heads of departments, and other appointments of great public importance, that the senate will interpose to prevent an unsuitable choice. ”

“ One reason why the pay of the members of the Senate and House is per diem is, because they contemplate their being together but a very inconsiderable part of their time; but I suppose, said he, that every gentleman who has considered the subject, has determined in his own mind that the Vice President ought to remain constantly at the seat of Government; he must always be ready to take the reins of Government when they shall fall out of the hands of the President ”

“ If there are, I call upon gentlemen to point them out; it does not result from the fashionable axiom, that the power which can create can destroy. The President can nominate, but he can appoint to office only by the advice and consent of the Senate. Therefore, it would follow, if the power of displacing results from that of creating, that the Senate should participate in displacing as well as creating officers. ”