Proof.—An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by the general Def. of the Emotions) . xxi., and note) ; therefore (III. iii.) , the emotion will cease to be a passion.
 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics (1677). copy citation

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Author Baruch Spinoza
Source Ethics
Topic passion emotions
Date 1677
Language English
Reference
Note Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
Weblink http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm

Context

“Proof.—That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred, is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.) ; wherefore, when this cause is removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it; therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are destroyed. Q.E.D.
PROP. III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.
Proof.—An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by the general Def. of the Emotions) . xxi., and note) ; therefore (III. iii.) , the emotion will cease to be a passion. If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, by reason (II. Q.E.D.
Corollary—An emotion therefore becomes more under our control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it is more known to us.
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