Anthony Kennedy

“ The reality of practice, amply reflected in many state- and federal-court opinions, shows that the challenge may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to discriminate against black jurors. By requiring trial courts to be sensitive to the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, our decision enforces the mandate of equal protection and furthers the ends of justice. ”

“ More fundamentally, the majority's conclusion proves far more than I think even it intends. Unless it is limited by some principle that is not apparent on its face, the Court's decision today provides that the fair-cross-section requirement is unconcerned even with a prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges to exclude Afro-American prospective jurors on the ground that they, as a class, lack the intelligence or impartiality fairly to fill the juror's role. ”

“ In fact, while a racially balanced jury would be representative of the racial groups in a community, the focus on race would likely distort the jury's reflection of other groups in society, characterized by age, sex, ethnicity, religion, education level, or economic class. ”

“ The reality is that a juror dismissed because of his race will leave the courtroom with a lasting sense of exclusion from the experience of jury participation, but possessing little incentive or resources to set in motion the arduous process needed to vindicate his own rights. We have noted that a substantial relation may entitle one party to raise the rights of another. ”

“ The Constitution does not permit the easy assumption that a community would be fairly represented by a jury selected by proportional representation of different races any more than it does that a community would be represented by a jury composed of quotas of jurors of different classes. ”

“ Many of the concerns expressed in Batson, a case where a black defendant objected to the exclusion of black jurors, support as well an equal protection claim by a defendant whose race or ethnicity is different from the dismissed juror's. To bar the claim whenever the defendant's race is not the same as the juror's would be to concede that racial exclusion of citizens from the duty, and honor, of jury service will be tolerated, or even condoned. ”

“ This does not mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the community; frequently such complete representation would be impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. ”

“ They do not support, in other words, the claim that any particular jury must comprise some specific number of members of each distinctive group. Only if prospective jurors are purposely excluded on account of their membership in a distinctive group-whether in the selection of the venire or in the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges-is the defendant denied the possibility of a fair cross section of the community. ”

“ The majority suggests that (1) the peremptory challenge system is "venerable" and essential to jury impartiality, ante, at 481-482; (2) limitations on a prosecutor's power peremptorily to challenge jurors on any basis, including race, would effectively destroy that system, ante, at 483-485; and (3) the Sixth Amendment is therefore not implicated by racially motivated peremptory exclusions, ante, at 483, 487. Each step in the majority's logic is plainly fallacious. ”

“ In view of the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race. ”

“ Petitioner's claim is that the State may not operate a jury selection mechanism, including a system of peremptory challenges, that eliminates black jurors solely on account of race. [18] It hardly answers petitioner's claim to state that the system of peremptory challenges "traditional [ly] " operates "by allowing both the accused and the State to eliminate persons thought to be inclined against their interests." Ante, at 480.
Finally, the Court contends that recognition of the Sixth Amendment right "would cripple the device of peremptory challenge." ”

“ Support can be drawn also from our established rules of standing, given the premise that a juror's right to equal protection is violated when he is excluded because of his race. See Batson, supra, at 87, 106 S.Ct., at 1718. Individual jurors subjected to peremptory racial exclusion have the legal right to bring suit on their own behalf, Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 90 S.Ct. ”

“ Our decision in Batson was based on the conclusion that " [r] acial discrimination in the selection of jurors harms not only the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try," but also "the excluded juror." 476 U.S., at 87, 106 S.Ct., at 1718. "Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." ”

“ Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287, 70 S.Ct. 629, 631-32, 94 L.Ed. 839 (1950) (plurality opinion) ; see also id., at 295, 70 S.Ct., at 635-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The prohibition of the Constitution against discrimination because of color does not require in and of itself the presence of a Negro on a jury. . . . The basis of selection cannot consciously take color into account. Such is the command of the Constitution") .
The fair-cross-section principle is central to our understanding of the Sixth Amendment. ”

“ Plausible arguments can be made for many erroneous propositions, but that does not make them any less wrong. Moreover, Justice STEVENS clearly demonstrates that invocations of our "venerable" peremptory challenge system are insufficient to defeat Holland's claims. ”

“ Under previous law, the Illinois Supreme Court and this Court would have been correct in presuming along with the Swain Court that all peremptory challenges are exercised for nondiscriminatory reasons. ”