Benjamin N. Cardozo

“ To hold that the claimants may not have restitution is to say that invalid, void, or voidable orders of the Commission have precisely the same force and effect as orders lawfully made, if from extrinsic facts and matters not cognizable by the court the conclusion may be drawn that the Commission might have made a valid order in the circumstances. ”

“ A federal court is without power to fix reasonable rates; its jurisdiction ends with a decision that established rates are confiscatory and an injunction against their enforcement; it may not impose a different rate, since so to do would be to usurp the functions of the rate-making body established by state law. [5] This the court below essayed by substituting what it found to be reasonable rates for the established state rates which it thought unreasonably low, and awarding the claimants the difference between the rates so fixed and those collected under color of the void order. ”

“ In a sense, then, it is true that there is support in fairness and reason for each of the two conclusions, the Commission's and the master's. More than this, however, must be made out to uphold the claims in suit. The claimants do not sustain the burden that is theirs by showing that the master set up a reasonable schedule. They must show that the other schedule, the one set up by the Commission, is unreasonable. In the absence of such a showing, the carrier does not offend against equity and conscience in standing on its possession and keeping what it got. ”

“ The answer is that Congress has not vested courts with jurisdiction to determine whether state rates discriminate against interstate commerce, and the statutory District Court had no more authority to investigate that question at the behest of any party before it than would any other state or federal court in an action for an overcharge. Congress has directed that the fact of discrimination shall be ascertained solely by the Commission. ”

“ The federal court by its inaction does not trench upon any jurisdiction, legislative or judicial, inherent in the state of Florida. It does not undertake to say that the rates collected by the carrier were lawful in the sense that a suit would lie to recover them if credit had been given to the shipper and a balance were now unpaid. All that the federal court does is to announce that it will stand aloof. It inquires whether anything has happened whereby a court of equity would be moved to impose equitable conditions upon equitable relief. ”

“ Upon the entry of the decree in obedience to our mandate, the statutory District Court had jurisdiction to entertain a prayer for restitution of the excess charges paid by shippers, parties to or represented in the cause, solely by force of its original erroneous judgment. [17] If the Coast Line, due to that court's error, had collected more than the legal rate, it owed an obligation to restore the excess to each of the complaining shippers. To refuse to consider their prayer would be to remit each of them to his separate action against the carrier for an overcharge ”

“ The carrier's position takes on an added equity when the fact is borne in mind that the charges of the Cummer schedule are less than compensatory and would result in confiscation if enforced by the power of the state after challenge by the carrier in appropriate proceedings. What those proceedings are has been a subject of dispute under the Florida decisions. For many years it was believed that a carrier objecting to a schedule as unreasonably low might put another into effect without asking the consent of any one, and justify its conduct later if a contest should develop. ”

“ It is not action of any kind. It is mere inaction and passivity in line with the historic attitude of courts of equity for centuries.
The claimants refer to cases in which this court has denied the power of the federal judiciary to take upon itself the functions of a rate-making body, charged with legislative duties. ”

“ As has been shown, the Cummer scale embodied the lawful rates for intrastate carriage. Until the federal Commission had raised those rates for the future by an order made in accordance with law, the scale remained in force, and the carrier was bound to observe it. The order of the Commission effective February 8, 1929, did not supersede it. The District Court has no power to disregard it or to fix rates other than those contained in it. The rights of intrastate shippers are fixed by that scale, have never been abrogated, and must be recognized in every court, state or federal. ”

“ This is not to say that, after the exhaustion of the administrative remedy, one aggrieved by a rate prescribed by state authority may not sue to set aside the rate as confiscatory. This he may do either in a state or a federal tribunal. [4] But such a suit is to set aside and enjoin the enforcement of the rate, which has the force of a statute until so overthrown. ”

“ Congress has provided for the setting aside of unlawful orders of the Commission by suits in equity in District Courts of the United States; [9] but it has never conferred upon any federal court jurisdiction to deal in the first instance with the matter of discrimination. [10] The federal courts lack power even to maintain by injunction a status or to enjoin a rate pending proceedings before the Commission looking to the entry of an order affecting intrastate rates. ”

“ Opinions will differ as to the qualifications of experts, the completeness of their inquiry into operating costs, the accuracy of their methods of computation, the soundness of their estimates. There is a zone of reasonableness within which judgment is at large. ”

“ The plaintiff had paid money to the defendant upon a policy of insurance against fire. The payment was procured by false representations and false swearing as to the extent of the loss, which, if seasonably discovered, would have worked a forfeiture of the policy. ”

“ In No. 344, the appellant is the railroad company which declares itself aggrieved because restitution was not denied altogether. In No. 345, the appellants are the state of Florida and intervening shippers, who declare themselves aggrieved because restitution was not awarded on the basis of the Cummer scale. ”

“ It 'is still at liberty, acting in accordance with the authority conferred by the statute, to make such determinations as the situation may require.' The mandate of reversal, giving effect to that decision, went down from this court on February 19, 1931, and on March 7, 1931 was filed in the court below. ”

“ Illinois Central, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 206 U.S. 441, 454, 27 S.Ct. 700, 51 L.Ed. 1128; Virginian R. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 665, 47 S.Ct. 222, 71 L.Ed. 463. This court has already held that their findings had support in the evidence before them. Florida v. United States, 292 U.S. 1, 12, 54 S.Ct. 603, 78 L.Ed. 1077.
The present record does not satisfy us that a new scale should be set up to govern claims for restitution. The field of inquiry is one in which the search for certainty is futile. ”