Byron White

“ By contrast, the Commerce Clause of its own force imposes limitations on state regulation of commerce and is the source of a right of action in those injured by regulations that exceed such limitations. [8]
Respondents also argue that the protection from interference with trade conferred by the Commerce Clause cannot be a "right" because it is subject to qualification or elimination by Congress. Brief for Respondents 21. That argument proves too much, however, because federal statutory rights may also be altered or eliminated by Congress. ”

“ Respondents argue, as the court below held, that the Commerce Clause merely allocates power between the Federal and State Governments and does not confer "rights." Brief for Respondents 14-17. There is no doubt that the Commerce Clause is a power-allocating provision, giving Congress pre-emptive authority over the regulation of interstate commerce. It is also clear, however, that the Commerce Clause does more than confer power on the Federal Government ”

“ The violation of a federal right that has been found to be implicit in a statute's language and structure is as much a 'direct violation' of a right as is the violation of a right that is clearly set forth in the text of the statute. ”

“ Petitioner does business as an unincorporated motor carrier with his principal place of business in Ohio. He owns tractors and trailers that are registered in Ohio and operated in several States including Nebraska. On December 17, 1984, he filed a class-action suit in a Nebraska trial court challenging the constitutionality of certain "retaliatory" taxes and fees imposed by the State of Nebraska on motor carriers with vehicles registered in other States and operated in Nebraska. ”

“ Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) , in which the Court struck down a New York statute to the extent that it excluded federally licensed boats from operating in New York waters.↑ See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1324 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "right" as " [a] legally enforceable claim of one person against another, that the other shall do a given act, or shall not do a given act") (citing Restatement of Property § 1 (1936) ) . That the right at issue here is an implied right under the Commerce Clause does not diminish its status as a "right, privilege, or immunity" under § 1983. ”

“ Chapman, 441 U.S., at 613, 99 S.Ct., at 1913. The Supremacy Clause, however, is "not a source of any federal rights"; rather, it " 'secure [s] ' federal rights by according them priority whenever they come in conflict with state law." ”

“ In context, the statement reads:↑ The statute at issue in Lynch was the jurisdictional counterpart to § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) , which contains the same "rights, privileges, or immunities" phrase. Even the dissent in Lynch agreed "without reservation" that the phrase was not limited to violations of "personal" rights, but disagreed with the majority on a different issue. See 405 U.S., at 556, 92 S.Ct., at 1124.↑ See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. ”

“ Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 613, n. 29, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1914, n. 29, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979) ; see also Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 527, 59 S.Ct. 954, 969, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.) .
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105) . ”