Byron White

“ Although we hold that a district court should exercise flexibility in considering requests for modification of an institutional reform consent decree, it does not follow that a modification will be warranted in all circumstances. Rule 60 (b) (5) provides that a party may obtain relief from a court order when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application," not when it is no longer convenient to live with the terms of a consent decree. ”

“ They also know that the prospective effect of such a judgment or decree will be open to modification where deemed equitable under Rule 60 (b) . Whether or not they bargain for more than what they might get after trial, they will be in no worse position if they settle and have the consent decree entered. At least they will avoid further litigation and perhaps will negotiate a decree providing more than what would have been ordered without the local government's consent. And, of course, if they litigate, they may lose. ”

“ Financial constraints may not be used to justify the creation or perpetuation of constitutional violations, but they are a legitimate concern of government defendants in institutional reform litigation and therefore are appropriately considered in tailoring a consent decree modification. ”

“ The Courts of Appeals have also observed that the public interest is a particularly significant reason for applying a flexible modification standard in institutional reform litigation because such decrees "reach beyond the parties involved directly in the suit and impact on the public's right to the sound and efficient operation of its institutions." ”

“ To refuse modification of a decree is to bind all future officers of the State, regardless of their view of the necessity of relief from one or more provisions of a decree that might not have been entered had the matter been litigated to its conclusion. The District Court seemed to be of the view that the problems of the fiscal officers of the State were only marginally relevant to the request for modification in this case. ”

“ It is apparent, however, that the decree itself nowhere expressly orders or reflects an agreement by petitioners to provide jail facilities having single cells sufficient to accommodate all future pretrial detainees, however large the number of such detainees might be. Petitioners' agreement and the decree appear to have bound them only to provide the specified number of single cells. If petitioners were to build a second new facility providing double cells that would meet constitutional standards, it is doubtful that they would have violated the consent decree. ”

“ For reasons appearing later in this opinion, this was not an adequate basis for denying the requested modification. The District Court also held that Rule 60 (b) (6) provided no more basis for relief. The District Court, and the Court of Appeals as well, failed to recognize that such rigidity is neither required by Swift nor appropriate in the context of institutional reform litigation.
It is urged that any rule other than the Swift "grievous wrong" standard would deter parties to litigation such as this from negotiating settlements and hence destroy the utility of consent decrees. ”

“ While a decision that clarifies the law will not, in and of itself, provide a basis for modifying a decree, it could constitute a change in circumstances that would support modification if the parties had based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the governing law. ”

“ Respondents urge that modification should be allowed only when a change in facts is both "unforeseen and unforeseeable." Brief for Respondents at 35. Such a standard would provide even less flexibility than the exacting Swift test; we decline to adopt it. Litigants are not required to anticipate every exigency that could conceivably arise during the life of a consent decree. ”

“ Citing "the unanticipated increase in jail population and the delay in completing the jail," the District Court modified the decree to permit the capacity of the new jail to be increased in any amount, provided that:
" (a) single-cell occupancy is maintained under the design for the facility;
" (b) under the standards and specifications of the Architectural Program, as modified, the relative proportion of cell space to support services will remain the same as it was in the Architectural Program ”

“ Four days before the deadline, the plan that formed the basis for the consent decree now before this Court was submitted to the District Court. Although plans for the new jail were not complete, the District Court observed that "the critical features of confinement, such as single cells of 80 sq. ft. for inmates, are fixed and safety, security, medical, recreational, kitchen, laundry, educational, religious and visiting provisions, are included. There are unequivocal commitments to conditions of confinement which will meet constitutional standards." Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. ”

“ Although the Architectural Program projected that construction of the new jail would be completed by 1983, ibid., work on the new facility had not been started by 1984. During the intervening years, the inmate population outpaced population projections. Litigation in the state courts ensued, and defendants were ordered to build a larger jail. Attorney General v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 394 Mass. 624, 477 N.E.2d 361 (1985) . Thereupon, plaintiff prisoners, with the support of the sheriff, moved the District Court to modify the decree to provide a facility with 435 cells. ”

“ Respondents counter that Bell is factually distinguishable and that double celling at the new jail would violate the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees. [13] If this is the case-the District Court did not decide this issue, 734 F.Supp., at 565-566-modification should not be granted. ”

“ Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, at 299, 75 S.Ct. 753 at 755-756, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955) . See also Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, ----, 110 S.Ct. 1651, ----, 109 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990) ; Milliken II, 433 U.S., at 281, 97 S.Ct., at 2757. ”