John Paul Stevens

“ Regardless of whether the white firefighters were parties to the decrees granting relief to their black co-workers, it would be quite wrong to assume that they could never collaterally attack such a decree. If a litigant has standing, he or she can always collaterally attack a judgment for certain narrowly defined defects. ”

“ The implementation of a consent decree affecting the interests of a multitude of nonparties, and the reliance on that decree as a defense to a charge of discrimination in hiring and promotion decisions, raise a legitimate concern of collusion. ”

“ Persons who have no right to appeal from a final judgment either because the time to appeal has elapsed or because they never became parties to the case-may nevertheless collaterally attack a judgment on certain narrow grounds. If the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, or if the judgment is the product of corruption, duress, fraud, collusion, or mistake, under limited circumstances it may be set aside in an appropriate collateral proceeding. ”

“ Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529-530, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3079, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986) :↑ The Eleventh Circuit, in a decision involving a previous attempt by white firefighters to set aside the consent decrees at issue in this litigation, itself observed: "There are . . . limitations on the extent to which a nonparty can undermine a prior judgment. A nonparty may not reopen the case and relitigate the merits anew; neither may he destroy the validity of the judgment between the parties." ”

“ Just as white employees in the past were innocent beneficiaries of illegal discriminatory practices, so is it inevitable that some of the same white employees will be innocent victims who must share some of the burdens resulting from the redress of the past wrongs. ”

“ They assert: "The Commission interprets Title VII to mean that actions taken pursuant to the direction of a Court Order cannot give rise to liability under Title VII." 29 CFR § 1608.8 (1989) . [30] Assuming that the District Court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous-which of course is a matter that is not before us-it seems perfectly clear that its judgment should have been affirmed. Any other conclusion would subject large employers who seek to comply with the law by remedying past discrimination to a never-ending stream of litigation and potential liability. ”

“ Any remedy that seeks to create employment conditions that would have obtained if there had been no violations of law will necessarily have an adverse impact on whites, who must now share their job and promotion opportunities with blacks. ”

“ The basis for the motion was the fact that, even without regard to the consent decrees, the plaintiffs had not proved a prima facie case against the Board, which had done nothing more than provide the City with the names of employees, both white and black, who were qualified for promotion. There was no evidence that the Board's certification process, or its testing procedures, adversely affected whites. ”

“ It is important, therefore, to make clear exactly what the District Court did hold and why its judgment should be affirmed.
* The litigation in which the consent decrees were entered was a genuine adversary proceeding. In 1974 and 1975, two groups of private parties and the United States brought three separate Title VII actions against the city of Birmingham (City) , the Personnel Board of Jefferson County (Board) , and various officials, [11] alleging discrimination in hiring and promotion in several areas of employment, including the fire department. ”

“ After a full trial in 1976, the District Court found that the defendants had violated Title VII and that a test used to screen job applicants was biased. App. 553. After a second trial in 1979 that focused on promotion practices-but before the District Court had rendered a decision-the parties negotiated two consent decrees, one with the City defendants and the other with the Board. App. to Pet. for Cert. 122a (City decree) , 202a (Board decree) . The United States is a party to both decrees. ”

“ In these cases, however, the plan was undoubtedly preceded by an adequate predicate of racial discrimination; thus, I need not consider whether there is some present-day purpose that might justify a race-conscious promotion scheme.↑ Moreover, the District Court, in its opinion approving the consent decrees, found that the remedies are "reasonably commensurate with the nature and extent of the indicated discrimination," are "limited in duration, expiring as particular positions generally reflect the racial . ”

“ In December 1985, the court conducted a 5-day trial limited to issues concerning promotions in the City's fire and engineering departments. [16] At that trial, respondents challenged the validity of the consent decrees; to meet that challenge, petitioners introduced the records of the 1976 trial, the 1979 trial, and the fairness hearing conducted in 1981. ”

“ The consent decrees obviously could not deprive them of any contractual rights, such as seniority, cf. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983) , or accrued vacation pay, cf. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 109 S.Ct. 1668, 104 L.Ed.2d 98 (1989) , or of any other legal rights, such as the right to have their employer comply with federal statutes like Title VII, cf. Firefighters v. Cleveland, supra, 478 U.S., at 529, 106 S.Ct., at 3079. ”

“ See also ante, at 763 (" [A] party seeking a judgment binding on another cannot obligate that person to intervene; he must be joined") . Because I conclude that the District Court did not hold that respondents were bound by the consent decrees, I do not reach this issue.↑ One leading commentator relies on the following poignant language employed by the Virginia Supreme Court to explain the significance of the doctrine limiting collateral attacks:↑ It was argued during the 1981 fairness hearing, in the first complaint filed in this litigation, see App. ”