Byron White

“ In the case before us, the language of § 853 is plain and unambiguous: all assets falling within its scope are to be forfeited upon conviction, with no exception existing for the assets used to pay attorney's fees or anything else, for that matter.
As observed above, § 853 (a) provides that a person convicted of the offenses charged in respondent's indictment "shall forfeit . . . any property" that was derived from the commission of these offenses. ”

“ Respondent contends that both the nature of the Government's property right in forfeitable assets, and the nature of the use to which he would have put these assets (i.e., retaining an attorney) , require some departure from our established rule of permitting pretrial restraint of assets based on probable cause. We disagree. In Caplin & Drysdale, we conclude that a weighing of these very interests suggests that the Government may-without offending the Fifth or Sixth Amendment-obtain forfeiture of property that a defendant might have wished to use to pay his attorney. ”

“ On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that respondent's statutory and Sixth Amendment challenges were lacking, but remanded the case to the District Court for an adversarial hearing "at which the government ha [d] the burden to demonstrate the likelihood that the assets are forfeitable"; if the Government failed its burden at such a hearing, the Court of Appeals held, any fees paid to an attorney would be exempt from forfeiture irrespective of the final outcome at respondent's trial. ”

“ We respect these canons, and they are quite often useful in close cases, or when statutory language is ambiguous. But we have observed before that such "interpretative canon [s are] not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature." ”

“ Section 853 (c) states that " [a] ll right, title, and interest in [forfeitable] property . . . vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture." Permitting a defendant to use assets for his private purposes that, under this provision, will become the property of the United States if a conviction occurs cannot be sanctioned. Moreover, this view is supported by the relevant legislative history, which states that " [t] he sole purpose of [§ 853's] restraining order provision . ”

“ Congress could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory in cases where the statute applied, or broader words to define the scope of what was o be forfeited. Likewise, the statute provides a broad definition of "property" when describing what types of assets are within the section's scope: "real property . ”

“ Under § 853 (e) (1) , the trial court "may" enter a restraining order if the United States requests it, but not otherwise, and it is not required to enter such an order if a bond or some other means to "preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) of this section for forfeiture" is employed. ”

“ Pursuant to this mandate, on remand, the District Court held a 4-day hearing on whether continuing the restraining order was proper. At the end of the hearing, the District Court ruled that it would continue the restraining order because the Government had "overwhelmingly established a likelihood" that the property in question would be forfeited at the end of trial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 86a. Ultimately, respondent's criminal case proceeded to trial, where he was represented by a Criminal Justice Act-appointed attorney. ”