Summary

Byron White Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier…

We agree that neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history, standing alone, would suffice to pre-empt local regulation. But it is also our view that even when considered together the language and the legislative materials relied on below are insufficient to demonstrate the necessary congressional intent to pre-empt. As for the statutory language, it is wholly inadequate to convey an express preemptive intent on its own. Section 136v plainly authorizes the "States" to regulate pesticides and just as plainly is silent with reference to local governments.
Source: Wikisource

Byron White Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier…

As noted in our discussion of express pre-emption, it is doubtful that Congress intended to exclude localities from the scope of § 136v (a) 's authorization, but however this may be, the type of local regulation at issue here would not fall within any impliedly pre-empted field.
Finally, like the EPA, we discern no actual conflict either between FIFRA and the ordinance before us or between FIFRA and local regulation generally. Mortier does not rely, nor could he, on the theory that compliance with the ordinance and FIFRA is a "physical impossibility."
Source: Wikisource

Byron White Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier…

As we have also made plain, local use permit regulations-unlike labeling or certification-do not fall within an area that FIFRA's "program" pre-empts or even plainly addresses. There is no indication that any coordination which the statute seeks to promote extends beyond the matters with which it deals, or does so strongly enough to compel the conclusion that an independently enacted ordinance that falls outside the statute's reach frustrates its purpose.
Source: Wikisource

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