Central Intelligence Agency

“ Traditional Polish nationalism reappeared everywhere, although with less romanticism and tempered with the realization of postwar Poland's vulnerable geopolitical position; Polish Catholicism revealed itself to have been strengthened by persecution; the individualism of the Polish peasant reasserted itself with a new determination born of his experience with collectivization; the social democratic bent of the workers and the intellectuals appeared reinforced by the years of disillusionment with Communism's "dictatorship of the proletariat" ”

“ Thus, the basic principles of Polish national policies in the early 1970s reflect considerable - in most instances total - autonomy in domestic affairs, guided by pragmatic considerations, and a strong commitment to the Polish-Soviet alliance in terms of mutual support for common foreign policy objectives. It is clear that in their general nature, these policy principles are close to, if not identical with, those prevailing during the Gomulka era. But, as Gierek's reforms already suggest, he is intent on fully utilizing the room for maneuver which these principles furnish. ”

“ The congress as a whole proved that while Polish labor is pleased with the material gains it has made under the Gierek regime, it is equally intent on safeguarding its newly found political influence. Labor has also served notice that while it appreciates the regime's effort to boost trade union prestige and to make the unions genuine vehicles for articulating labor grievances, it will take the regime's stated intent in this regard seriously and will not allow the trade unions to become, once again, a simple regime tool for the exploitation of the working class. ”

“ The disarray within the security apparatus, the Soviet Party Congress criticism of Stalin which fell on ready ground in Poland, the Poznan riots, the intellectual turmoil which exceeded all formerly permissible limits, and the general atmosphere of popular expectation and willingness to bring about change by whatever means gave every indication of coalescing into an uncontrollable revolutionary situation, sweeping aside the party and resulting in a bloodbath through Soviet armed intervention - as occurred later in Hungary. ”

“ Finally, there is the issue of the "proper" degree of popular pressure on the regime, and its relation to that kind of stability which would enhance and not inhibit chances for reform. Too little pressure could generate overconfidence in the leadership and produce a regression toward the former inertia. Too much pressure could raise anew the specter of a loss of party control, possibly bringing about a situation in which the use of force - by the Polish regime itself and/or the Soviet Union - could become the only recourse. ”

“ The divergent trends in public opinion contain elements that are at once conducive and inimical to change in Poland, and thus to the long-term stability of the regime. The existence of widespread confidence in the Gierek regime generated by expectations of real economic progress is a factor that not only induces the regime to maintain its momentum and to fulfill its pledges, but also contributes to increased productivity and efficiency at all levels - the keys to the success of the reforms. ”

“ Gierek also had to cope with the face that the credibility of the Communist regime had been seriously undermined. The vast majority of Poles, who had supported Gomulka in 1956 only to become thoroughly disillusioned with him over the ensuing decade and a half, were not disposed to place unqualified trust in the promises of his successor. The people, in short, demanded action rather than mere promises, and the new leadership could no longer count on their unlimited patience. ”

“ By contrast, however, the fact that popular expectations almost certainly exceed the regime's ability to fulfill them creates a potentially destabilizing situation. The people, especially the older generation, are still disappointed by what they regard as Gomulka's betrayal of the promises of 1956, and may adopt an attitude which considers any slackening of Gierek's course as an abandonment of his entire program. Such skepticisms could lead to a self-accelerating shirking of efforts, and endanger the very reforms that all of the people seem to want. ”

“ The workers, aware that persistence and boldness on their part has bred success, have shown that they will continue to hold the new regime accountable for its promises of increased welfare and a new role for themselves in the determination of economic policy. The fact that Gierek's innovations in labor policy were initially forced on him by the workers' militancy does not detract from their novelty nor from the fact that, despite continued shortcomings, a new institutional and operational relationship appears to be developing between the regime and labor in Poland. ”

“ The ultimate failure of these security forces to prevent political upheaval in December 1970 was not a result of their own lack of efficiency, but rather of the weaknesses and strains inherent in the political leadership, the absence of Soviet support for that leadership, and the subsequent collapse of clear command channels. Indeed, the acknowledged brutality of the internal security components - as distinct from the bulk of regular army units deployed during the disturbances - demonstrated that these security forces were responsive to the Gomulka regime even as its power was crumbling. ”

“ At the same time, they have emphasized that while the quality of political leadership is all important, it is the work ethic and the energy of the people that ultimately determine the success of that leadership. ”

“ Under the more permissive and dynamic political climate imparted by the Gierek regime, the newly rejuvenated parliament shows renewed signs of exercising its prerogatives and thus becoming a more genuine deliberative body. Although it is unlikely that the Sejm will play any more of a policymaking role vis-a-vis the controlling Communist party leadership than hitherto - nor can it hope to initiate major legislation without the party's guidance and approval - parliament's more representative composition will enable it to keep in closer touch with the tenor of public opinion. ”

“ The key to Gierek's long-term prospects evidently is his ability to achieve results in the economic area. Here, Gierek inherited an inert bureaucracy and a backwardness which made Poland lag even behind other Eastern European countries in introducing technological change and improvements in management and planning. Much has already been accomplished in terms of measurable consumer welfare, but institutional shifts have been negligible and there is no evidence that any major changes toward even a modified market economy are in the offing. ”

“ A thorough review of security practices and a purge of personnel in the upper echelons of the security apparatus in 1971 served a dual purpose: to weed out those persons with lingering loyalties to Moczar, and to change that image of the security forces so that public cooperation would be enlisted in the maintenance of law and order. The major tool in this public relations campaign has been a balanced, relatively sophisticated, and moderate approach to what might be called "police-community" relations. ”

“ Since the Gierek regime came to power in December 1970, the party's and the government's more open style of rule, encouragement of "constructive dissent" by the people, and the eased political and social climate in the country have further reduced the potential for subversive activity. More simply, the Gierek regime's willingness to provide legitimate political and social channels for the controlled articulation of dissent has reduced the need of its critics to organize clandestinely. ”

“ Although the listed constitutional rights of citizens are qualified and may be legally bypassed or ignored at the Communist regime's choosing, the bill of rights often has been used in the past as the basis for public or private protests addressed to the government by some of its vocal critics, such as the powerful Roman Catholic Church, the intellectuals, and youth. The party's statement that the new constitution's provisions concerning the rights and duties of citizens should "stress their socialist character" suggests that little change in the direction of liberalism is to be expected. ”

“ The political life of the country and its governmental apparatus, therefore, are based not on the popular will but on the needs of the Communist regime in maintaining power and in attempting to remold Polish society along Communist lines. ”

“ Poland, whose people have consistently regarded their nation as an outpost of Western civilization in Western Europe, has been under the rule of a Soviet-supported Communist regime since World War II. Although the population traditionally has been anti-Russian, anti-Communist, and deeply committed to a unique blend of nationalism and Roman Catholicism, the rulers of the nation are materially and ideologically bound to the Soviet brand of communism and profess to be convinced atheists. ”

“ Above all, Gierek's approachability, pragmatism, and stated dedication to a just reward for hard work are the same qualities that earned him the respect of Silesia's industrial workers during his 13-year tenure there.
As a group, the new Polish leadership is the only one in Eastern Europe in which the postwar generation predominates. Most of the new leaders are not products of the "revolutionary" tradition, the resistance movement, or Soviet training, but rather of the universities and educational institutions of Communist Poland. ”

“ Gierek is no liberal and he has made it clear that the political spontaneity accompanied by loss of Communist party control that characterized the Czechoslovak heresy in 1968 will not be tolerated in Poland. He has stressed that Poland's alliance with the USSR, the basic features of the internal system, and the party's monopoly of power are not to be tampered with. While he has eschewed force, he has hammered home the need for greater national discipline, particularly a dedication by the workers and all strata of the population to a new "work ethic." ”

“ Since 1956, Polish diplomacy, whether under Gomulka or under Gierek, has worked to this end. Despite frequent pauses and setbacks in the 1960s, the goal has been consistent: to seek a general settlement in central Europe which would remove Poland from the field of East-West rivalry in which the Poles have felt it would always play the role of a potential pawn. The specific proposals put forward were designed to exclude, or postpone, the reunification of Germany; at the same time these proposals generally have been accompanied by separate approaches, on a bilateral basis, to West Germany. ”

“ The government, by being more responsive to the people and more representative of them, acts as the party's primary public opinion agent, and provides a forum for a greater degree of popular expression. By derivation, and probably by Gierek's deliberate calculation, the enhanced interaction between the people and the governmental apparatus may also help to shield the party itself from inevitable daily friction and, possibly, to make it a less easily identifiable target for such violent outbursts of popular frustration as occurred in December 1970. ”

“ The 1952 constitution sets forth "socialism," defined in general terms, as the goal toward which the Polish state is tending. Socialized farming, however, is not specified as the predominant system in agriculture as it is in the Soviet constitution; rather, individual farming by "working peasants" is declared to be under state protection. This provision did not prevent the collectivization drive during the first half of the 1950s, but it did obviate a potential constitutional inconsistency at the time of the spontaneous dissolution of collectives in 1956. ”

“ During the lengthy debate in Bonn over the West German treaties with Poland and the USSR, the Polish leadership reached with relative restraint, although the press did not conceal its apprehension and occasionally lapsed into polemics. Meanwhile, in line with an understanding technically separate from but in reality intrinsically connected with the spirit of the treaty, the Polish regime permitted the more rapid repatriation of ethnic Germans from Poland - an estimated 30,000 between December 1970 and mid-1972. ”