G. E. Moore

G. E. Moore

Summary

Portrait of G. E. Moore G. E. Moore,  Ethics — Chapter VI (1912)

“ But, on the other hand, the mere fact (if it is a fact) that we sometimes can, in some sense, do what we don’t do, does not necessarily entitle us to say that we have Free Will. We certainly haven’t got it, unless we can; but it doesn’t follow that we have got it, even if we can. Whether we have or not will depend upon the precise sense in which it is true that we can. So that even if we do decide that we really can often, in some sense, do what we don’t do, this decision by itself does not entitle us to say that we have Free Will. ”
Source: Wikisource

Portrait of G. E. Moore G. E. Moore,  Ethics — Chapter VI (1912)

“ Our theory, therefore, has not been maintaining, after all, that right and wrong depend upon what the agent absolutely can do, but only on what he can do, if he chooses. And this makes an immense difference. For, by confining itself in this way, our theory avoids a controversy, which cannot be avoided by those who assert that right and wrong depend upon what the agent absolutely can do. There are few, if any, people who will expressly deny that we very often really could, if we had chosen, have done something different from what we actually did do. ”
Source: Wikisource

Portrait of G. E. Moore G. E. Moore,  Ethics — Chapter VI (1912)

“ If all that were really ever true of us were merely that we could have acted differently, if we had chosen, then, these people would say, it really would be true that none of our actions are ever right and that none are ever wrong. They will say, therefore, that our theory entirely misses out one absolutely essential condition of right and wrong—the condition that, for an action to be right or wrong, it must be freely done. ”
Source: Wikisource

Get perspective with Kwize: daily news enlightened by great literature