Gerald K. Haines

“ Reiterating that the plan was “to scare not kill,” he nevertheless suggested that might wish to “study the suggestion for utility now or in the future.” [31]
While Agency paramilitary and psychological warfare planning both included suggestions which implied assassination proposals, these proposals appear never to have been implemented. The chief had sought to use Castillo Armas’ “K” group scheme but there was no State Department or White House support. Such was also the case when the subject of assassination emerged in high-level Agency and inter-agency planning discussions. ”

“ The idea of forming assassination teams (“K” groups) apparently onginated with Castillo Armas in 1952. Adapting Castillo Armas’ concept, the chief routinely included two assassination specialists in his training plans. [26]
CIA planning for sabotage teams in early 1954 also included creating a “K” group trained to perform assassinations. The main mission of the sabotage teams or harassment teams, however, was to attack local Communists and Communist property and to avoid attacks on the army. ”

“ Utilizing the anti-Communist network established by a Guatemalan dissident, the Chief of Political and Psychological Operations at LINCOLN developed a major propaganda campaign against the Arbenz government. Part of this program included the sending of new mourning cards to top Communist leaders. These cards mourned the imminent purge or execution of various Communists throughout the world and hinted of the forthcoming doom of the addressee. Death letters were also sent to top Guatemalan Communists such as Guatemala City Station, prepared these letters for the dissident leader. ”

“ CIA and Intelligence Community reports tended to support the view that Guatemala and the Arbenz regime were rapidly falling under the sway of the Communists. [3] Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Walter Bedell Smith and other Agency officials believed the situation called for action. Their assessment was, that without help, the Guatemalan opposition would remain inept, disorganized and ineffective. ”

“ PBSUCCESS By the fall of 1953, US policymakers, including CIA officials, were searching for a new overall program for dealing with Arbenz. The Guatemalan leader had moved even closer to the Communists. He had expropriated additional United Fruit Company holdings, legalized the Guatemalan Communist Party, the PGT, and suppressed anti-Communist opposition following an abortive uprising at Salamá. In response, the National Security Council authorized a covert action operation against Arbenz and gave the CIA primary responsibility. ”

“ There is no record that Headquarters took any action regarding Castillo Armas’ list.
After the PBFORTUNE operation was officially terminated, the Agency continued to pick up reports of assassination planning on the part of the Guatemalan opposition. In late November 1952, for example, an opposition Guatemalan leader, in a conversation with SEEKFORD, confirmed that Castillo Armas had special “K” groups whose mission was to kill all leading political and military leaders, and that the hit list with the location of the homes and offices of all targets had already been drawn up. ”

“ CIA officers responsible for planning and implementing covert action against the Arbenz government engaged in extensive discussions over a two-and a half year period about the possibility of assassinating Guatemalan officials . Consideration of using assassination to purge Guatemala of Communist influence was born of the extreme international tensions in the early Cold War years. The Agency did not act unilaterally, but consulted with State Department officials with responsibility for policy toward Latin America. ”

“ In the early 1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency directed covert operations aimed at removing the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman from power in Guatemala. Included in these efforts were various suggestions for the disposal of key Arbenz government officials and Guatemalan Communists. The Agency drew up lists of individuals for assassination, discussed training Guatemalan exiles for assassination teams, and conducted intimidation programs against prominent Guatemalan officials. ”

“ Elimination lists were never finalized, assassination proposals remained controversial within the Agency, and it appears that no Guatemalans associated with Arbenz were assassinated. Both CIA and State Department officers were divided (and undecided) about using assassination.
Discussion of whether to assassinate Guatemalan Communists and leaders sympathetic to Communist programs took place in a historical era quite different from the present. Soviet Communism had earned a reputation of using whatever means were expedient to advance Moscow’s interests internationally. ”

“ After Castillo Armas assumed the presidency, however, Arbenz was allowed to leave the country for Mexico, which granted him political asylum. In addition, 120 other Arbenz government officials or Communists departed Guatemala under a safe passage agreement with the Castillo Armas government. [52] There is no evidence that any Guatemalans were executed. ”

“ It attempts to illustrate the depth of such planning and the level of involvement of Agency officials. It also attempts to detail where the proposals originated, who approved them, and how advanced the preparations for such actions were. Finally, the study examines the implementation of such planning and the results—i. e., in the end, the plans were abandoned and no Arbenz officials or Guatemalan Communists were killed. ”

“ The “Nerve War Against Individuals,” as it was called, also included sending wooden coffins, hangman’s nooses, and phony bombs to selected individuals. Such slogans as “Here Lives a Spy” and “You have Only 5 Days” were painted on their houses. ”

“ Assassination was a nasty but frequent tool of Guatemalan politics. Arbenz himself benefited from the killing of his arch rival for the presidency Franciso Arana in 1949. ↑ See to memo, “Conference,” 1 December 1952, Box 134 (S) . ↑ To memo, “Current Planning of Calligeris Organization,” 12 December 1952, Box 134 (S) . See also, Acting Chief, Branch, Western Hemisphere Division that reported in November 1952 that Castillo Armas was studying PW use of liquidation lists. ”

“ On 21 May asked Headquarters for permission to implement the Officer’s proposal and asked for suggestions about the specific individuals to be targeted. [40] No reply from Headquarters to has been found. On 29 May 1954, however, the chief requested the names of the “four men” he and the Officer discussed assassinating. ”