John Marshall Harlan II

Name: Chambers v. Maroney — Concurrence
Author: John Marshall Harlan II

Summary

In his concurrence to Chambers v. Maroney, Justice John Marshall Harlan II examines the Court’s reasoning for allowing warrantless searches of vehicles, highlighting the Fourth Amendment’s safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. Writing in the context of a contested automobile search, Harlan challenges the majority’s dependence on urgent circumstances, asserting that temporarily seizing the vehicle to obtain a warrant would better reconcile law enforcement needs with constitutional protections.

He emphasizes the significance of judicial supervision, maintaining that warrantless searches represent a more profound breach of privacy than the brief restriction of the car’s movement. The concurrence also addresses procedural rights, pointing out the defendant’s right to receive effective legal representation during pivotal phases of the trial. Harlan’s opposing perspective underscores a firm dedication to preserving the Fourth Amendment’s structure against broad interpretations.

Quotes from Chambers v. Maroney — Concurrence (John Marshall Harlan II)

John Marshall Harlan II, Chambers v. Maroney — Concurrence

“ In sustaining the search of the automobile I believe the Court ignores the framework of our past decisions circumscribing the scope of permissible search without a warrant. The Court has long read the Fourth Amendment's proscription of 'unreasonable' searches as imposing a general principle that a search without a warrant is not justified by the mere knowledge by the searching officers of facts showing probable cause. ”

[↩︎]

Source: Wikisource

John Marshall Harlan II, Chambers v. Maroney — Concurrence

“ To be sure, one can conceive of instances in which the occupant, having nothing to hide and lacking concern for the privacy of the automobile, would be more deeply offended by a temporary immobilization of his vehicle than by a prompt search of it. However, such a person always remains free to consent to an immediate search, thus avoiding any delay. Where consent is not forthcoming, the occupants of the car have an interest in privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment even where the circumstances justify a temporary seizure. ”

[↩︎]

Source: Wikisource

John Marshall Harlan II, Chambers v. Maroney — Concurrence

“ The Court concedes that the police could prevent removal of the evidence by temporarily seizing the car for the time necessary to obtain a warrant. It does not dispute that such a course would fully protect the interests of effective law enforcement; rather it states that whether temporary seizure is a 'lesser' intrusion than warrantless search 'is itself a debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances.' Ante, at 51-52. [8] I believe it clear that a warrantless search involves the greater sacrifice of Fourth Amendment values. ”

[↩︎]

Source: Wikisource

John Marshall Harlan II, Chambers v. Maroney — Concurrence

“ Even where no arrests are made, persons who wish to avoid a search-either to protect their privacy or to conceal incriminating evidence-will almost certainly prefer a brief loss of the use of the vehicle in exchange for the opportunity to have a magistrate pass upon the justification for the search. ”

[↩︎]

Source: Wikisource

John Marshall Harlan II, Chambers v. Maroney — Concurrence

“ Where counsel has no acquaintance with the facts of the case and no opportunity to plan a defense, the result is that the defendant is effectively denied his constitutional right to assistance of counsel.
It seems to me that what this record reveals about counsel's handling of the search and seizure claims and about the tenor of his cross-examination of the government witness Havicon, when coupled with his late entry into the case, called for more exploration by the District Court before petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim could be dismissed. ”

[↩︎]

Source: Wikisource

John Marshall Harlan II, Chambers v. Maroney — Concurrence

“ Fidelity to this established principle requires that, where exceptions are made to accommodate the exigencies of particular situations, those exceptions be no broader than necessitated by the circumstances presented. ”

[↩︎]

Source: Wikisource

John Marshall Harlan II, Chambers v. Maroney — Concurrence

“ Where officers have probable cause to search a vehicle on a public way, a further limited exception to the warrant requirement is reasonable because 'the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.' Carroll v. ”

[↩︎]

Source: Wikisource

John Marshall Harlan II, Chambers v. Maroney — Concurrence

“ For example, the Court has recognized that an arrest creates an emergency situation justifying a warrantless search of the arrestee's person and of 'the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence' ”

[↩︎]

Source: Wikisource

John Marshall Harlan II, Chambers v. Maroney — Concurrence

“ From the lower court opinion, as will appear later, we are led to believe that counsel was not wholly familiar with all aspects of the case before trial.' 408 F.2d 1186, 1191.↑ Mr. Tamburo stated to the trial court: 'Your Honor, at the first trial, the District Attorney attempted to introduce into evidence some .38 calibre bullets that were found at the Chambers' home after his arrest. * * * At that trial, it was objected to and the objection was sustained, and I would also like to object to it now, I don't think it is good for the Jury to hear it. ”

John Marshall Harlan II

Summary

Quotes from Chambers v. Maroney — Concurrence (John Marshall Harlan II)

Common terms

Similar works

Get perspective with Kwize: daily news enlightened by great literature