National Transportation Safety Board

“ The Federal Aviation Regulations impose higher landing minima on the pilot of a charter flight, unless he is qualified at the airport and lower minima have been established for the airport in the air carrier's operations specifications. In this instance the normal minima for Runway 11 were increased from 1,240 feet and 1/2-mile to 1,240 feet and 1 mile. ”

“ All segments of the aviation industry continue to focus attention on the unique demands for crew coordination and vigilance during nonprecision approaches. Particular emphasis should be placed on the accelerated development of area navigation systems with vertical guidance capability and on heads-up display system. ”

“ Select 15° flaps, extend slats, and slow to appropriate maneuvering speed prior to commencing approach. Commence procedure turn 30 seconds past outer maker (depending on wind) . Select 25° flaps, extend gear, complete landing checklist and slow to appropriate maneuvering speed. Over radio fix start descent to MDA, maintain previous maneuvering speed. Select 50° flaps, slows to Vref + 5 knots when runway is sighted. Reduce thrust slowly over threshold to obtain VRef speed, touchdown target is 1,000 feet from threshold. ”

“ The primary surface of Runway 11 was 1,000 feet wide and extended 200 feet beyond the threshold at each end of the runway. ↑ Paragraph 930 (1) gives the dimensions for the final approach area as 50,000 feet long measured outward along the final approach course from a point 200 feet outward from the runway threshold, and 1,000 feet wide at the point expanding uniformly along the localizer course to a width of 16,000 feet at a point 50,000 feet from the beginning point. ”

“ All altitudes are mean sea level (m.s.l.) unless otherwise indicated. ↑ Minimum Descent Altitude is the lowest altitude to which descent shall be authorized in procedures not using a glide slope. Aircraft are not authorized to descend below the MDA until the runway environment (runway threshold, or approved lighting aids or other markings identifiable with the runway) is in sight and the aircraft is in a position to descend for a normal landing ↑ The DC-9-30 aircraft was modified to incorporate a simulated DC-9-10 static system. ”

“ The procedure for either a missed-approach or a rejected landing was the same:
Set takeoff power. Rotate immediately to stop descent (minimum 10°) and simultaneously call flaps 15°. Continue as in normal takeoff. Do not raise gear until climb is established. The radio altimeter system was described in Southern Airways DC-9 Operating Manual in general terms, including the following, "Two separate radio altimeter systems on the (Dash 31) ... are provided to obtain precise altitude information above the ground at the minimum decision (sic) altitude (MDA) . ”

“ The coordinator's duties involved supervising and expediting ground operations, arranging for fueling, completing weight and balance forms, etc. In the performance of these duties, he normally communicated directly with the captain shortly before landing. Although he was permitted to enter the cock under these circumstances, he was not authorized to occupy the jumpseat. In this instance, the charter coordinator was in the cockpit during the instrument approach, and discussed the fueling at Huntington. He also commented, "Bet'll be a missed-approach" approximately 16 seconds before impact. ”

“ The main wreckage site was located 4,219 feet from the threshold of Runway 11, and approximately 225 feet south of the middle marker. The aircraft cut a swath 39° below the horizontal through the trees at the wreckage site and came to rest in an inverted attitude.
The ground elevation at the initial tree impact was 860 feet m.s.l., and the elevation at the break of the tree at this location was 916 feet 2 inches m.s.l. The highest ground elevation adjacent to the swath cut was 894.5 feet m.s.l. ”

“ The basic differences in the two approach charts were: (1) an increase in the Minimum Sector Altitude [4] from 2,500 feet to 2,600 feet m.s.l., for the sector west of the airport (180° clockwise through 360° inclusive) ; and (2) the addition of holding instructions to the missed-approach procedure text.
The Localizer-Runway 11 approach required a procedure turn southof the 114° localizer course within 10 miles of the outer marker, at 2,600 feet m.s.l. ”

“ Advise when you want them cut." The crew's response, "Very good," was the last transcription received. At approximately 1936, tower personnel observed a red glow west of the airport. When no response to subsequent radio calls was received, the tower controller initiated the emergency.
Witnesses in the vicinity of the Runway 11 localizer course generally agreed that the aircraft was low, but otherwise appeared normal. The weather was described as vary between mist and light rain with low clouds. Some witnesses also indicated that visibility was restricted due to fog. ”

“ Mechanical and electrical checks, g-loading on all three axes with indiscriminate interruptions of electrical power, and attempts mechanically to impede or accelerate foil travel all failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the aberrations. ”

“ The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause of this accident was the descent below Minimum Descent Altitude during a nonprecision approach under adverse operating conditions, without visual contact with the runway environment. ”

“ Such emphasis is needed to assure that these operators (1) using the best means available to enable pilots to qualify under 121, 445, and (2) requiring pilots to show that they have acquired the requisite knowledge prior to completion of a flight release. ”

“ The flight departed Kinston at 1838 and proceeded in accordance with the flight plan. Subsequent air traffic control transfers were accomplished and, at 1923, SOU 932 established contact with Huntington Approach Control by advising, "... we're descending to five thousand." [3] The controller cleared them for a localizer approach to Runway 11 and added, "... the surface winds are favoring runway twenty-nine, three five zero degrees at six, altimeter two niner six seven..." ”

“ This information is essential to the pilot in his decision to land or initiate a go-around maneuver." The chief pilot for Southern Airways testified that this statement was misleading that it was excerpted from the DACO DC-9 manual, and was more applicable to precision approaches over level terrain than to nonprecision approaches of this type. He emphasized that Southern's pilots were cautioned in training against using the radio altimeter as a primary reference. In amplifying their training procedure, he also indicated that the pilots were trained to call out altitudes in terms of m.s.l. ”

“ The recorder unit had been exposed to extreme heat in the fire after the impact, but the recording medium magazine was easily removed and the recorded foil surface was virtually undamaged. A readout of the last 10 minutes of normally recorded traces were prepared. The altitude trace was adjusted for an altimeter setting of 29.67 to indicate m.s.l. ”

“ This would correspond to an indicated altitude increase of 13 feet/hour. The low-pressure area moved steady northeastward with little change in intensity. Although there was an extensive area of light rain, no showery precipitation (possibly indicative of more rapid fire variation) was reported within 250 miles of Huntington. 1.8 Aids to Navigation
The Tri-State Airport was equipped with an ILS localizer, but no glide slope. The localizer provided a nonprecision approach to Runway 11. The crew's Jeppesen Approach Chart depicting this procedure was dated December 27, 1968 ”