Portal:Supreme Court of the United States

“ The more administrable and workable rule, rather, is the one compelled by our precedent: When counsel’s deficient performance forfeits an appeal that a defendant otherwise would have taken, the defendant gets a new opportunity to appeal. ”

“ While we do not address what constitutes a defendant’s breach of an appeal waiver or any responsibility counsel may have to discuss the potential consequences of such a breach, it should be clear from the foregoing that simply filing a notice of appeal does not necessarily breach a plea agreement, given the possibility that the defendant will end up raising claims beyond the waiver’s scope. ”

“ And should Garza accept the majority’s invitation, he could give up much more. If Garza appeals his sentence and thereby breaches his plea agreements, Idaho will be free to file additional charges against him, argue for a “Persistent violator” sentencing enhancement that could land him in prison for life, and refer him for federal prosecution. It simply defies logic to describe counsel’s attempt to avoid those consequences as deficient or prejudicial. ”

“ As for prejudice, Garza cannot benefit from a presumed-prejudice finding since he cannot establish that his counsel caused the forfeiture of his appeal, as Flores-Ortega requires. Garza knowingly and voluntarily bargained away his right to appeal in exchange for a lower sentence. If any prejudice resulted from that decision, it cannot be attributed to his counsel.
It does not matter that certain appellate issues–specifically, (1) the voluntariness of the plea agreement and (2) a breach of the agreement by the State–are not waivable. Garza did not ask his counsel to appeal those issues. ”

“ Strickland does not explain how the Constitution requires a new trial for violations of any right to counsel.
Third, our precedents seek to use the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to achieve an end it is not designed to guarantee. The right to counsel is not an assurance of an error-free trial or even a reliable result. It ensures fairness in a single respect: permitting the accused to employ the services of an attorney. ”

“ In my view, a defendant who has executed an appeal waiver cannot show prejudice arising from his counsel’s decision not to appeal unless he (1) identifies claims he would have pursued that were outside the appeal waiver; (2) shows that the plea was involuntary or unknowing; or (3) establishes that the government breached the plea agreement. Garza has not made any such showing, so he cannot establish prejudice. Furthermore, because Garza’s counsel acted reasonably, Garza also cannot establish deficient performance. ”

“ That makes it especially improper to impose that role upon the defendant simply because his opportunity to appeal was relinquished by deficient counsel. “Those whose right to appeal has been frustrated should be treated exactly like any other appellants; they should not be given an additional hurdle to clear just because their rights were violated at some earlier stage in the proceedings.” ”

“ There is no persuasive reason to depart from an ordinary Strickland analysis in cases involving an attorney’s decision to honor his client’s agreement to waive his appeal rights. Garza contends that it is unfair to require pro se defendants to identify the issues they would have raised on appeal. But pro se defendants always bear the burden of showing ineffective assistance of counsel ”

“ Even where state law or a plea agreement preserves limited appeal rights, an attorney does not fail to “show up for appeal” by declining to challenge a waived issue. Nunez, supra, at 454.
The deficiency analysis in this case would likely be different if Garza had informed his counsel that he desired to breach the plea agreements and file an appeal–despite the waiver and in full awareness of the associated risks–for the sake of an identified goal that had any hope of being advanced by the filing of an appeal. But the record shows that Garza simply sought a more lenient sentence. ”

“ The Government’s proposal is also unworkable. For one, it would be difficult and time consuming for a postconviction court to determine–perhaps years later–what appellate claims a defendant was contemplating at the time of conviction. [13] Moreover, because most postconviction petitioners will be pro se, courts would regularly have to parse both (1) what claims a pro se defendant seeks to raise and (2) whether each plausibly invoked claim is subject to the defendant’s appeal waiver (which can be complex, see supra, at 4–6) , all without the assistance of counseled briefing. ”

“ Flores-Ortega states, in one sentence, that the loss of the “entire [appellate] proceeding itself, which a defendant wanted at the time and to which he had a right,... demands a presumption of prejudice.” Id., at 483. Idaho and the U. S. Government, participating as an amicus on Idaho’s behalf, seize on this language, asserting that Garza never “had a right” to his appeal and thus that any deficient performance by counsel could not have caused the loss of any such appeal. ”

“ As with most ineffective-assistance claims, a defendant seeking to show that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file an appeal must show deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (1984) . Relying on Flores-Ortega, the majority finds that Garza has satisfied both prongs. In so holding, it adopts a rule whereby a criminal defendant’s invocation of the words “I want to appeal” can undo all sworn attestations to the contrary and resurrect waived statutory rights. ”

“ The traditional common-law rule that there was no right to assistance of counsel for felony offenses received widespread criticism. As Blackstone noted, this rule “seems to be not at all of a piece with the rest of the humane treatment of prisoners by the English law.” 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, at 349; see ibid. (“ [U] pon what face of reason can that assistance be denied to save the life of a man, which yet is allowed him in prosecutions for every petty trespass”) . ”

“ With that context in mind, we turn to the precise legal issues here. As an initial matter, we note that Garza’s attorney rendered deficient performance by not filing the notice of appeal in light of Garza’s clear requests. As this Court explained in Flores-Ortega:
“We have long held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable. ”

“ He will be liable if his client’s interests suffer on account of his failure to understand and apply those rules and principles of law that are well established and clearly defined in the elementary books, or which have been declared in adjudged cases that have been duly reported and published a sufficient length of time to have become known to those who exercise reasonable diligence in keeping pace with the literature of the profession. ”

“ It explained that Garza needed to identify “non-frivolous grounds for contending on appeal either that (i) the appeal waiver is invalid or unenforceable, or (ii) the issues he wants to pursue on appeal are outside the waiver’s scope.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a. The Idaho Court of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. Notably, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to presume negligent performance because state law imposes a duty on counsel not to file frivolous litigation and to avoid taking actions that will jeopardize the benefit his client gained from the plea bargain. ”

“ This means that if the district court does not impose the specific sentence as recommended by both parties, I will be allowed to withdraw my plea of guilty pursuant to Rule 11 (d) (4) of the Idaho Criminal Rules and proceed to a jury trial”) ; see also id., at 128. ↑ A defendant could bring a state-law tort action against his attorney. As one commentator explained:
“An attorney is bound to exercise such skill, care and diligence in any matter entrusted to him, as members of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters.... ”

“ It is helpful, in analyzing Garza’s case, to first address two procedural devices on which the case hinges: appeal waivers and notices of appeal.
1
We begin with the term “appeal waivers.” While the term is useful shorthand for clauses like those in Garza’s plea agreements, it can misleadingly suggest a monolithic end to all appellate rights. [4] In fact, however, no appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims.
As courts widely agree, “ [a] valid and enforceable appeal waiver... only precludes challenges that fall within its scope.” United States v. ”

“ Compounding the trouble, defendants would be asked to make these showings in the face of the heightened standards and related hurdles that attend many postconviction proceedings. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. §§2254, 2255; see also Brief for Idaho Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 22–25. ”

“ United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140, 157 (2006) (Alito, J., dissenting) ; cf. Collins v. Virginia, 584 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2–5) (explaining that the exclusionary rule is not required by the Fourth Amendment) . ”

“ Hardman, 778 F. 3d 896, 899 (CA11 2014) ; see also ibid., n. 2 (collecting cases from the 11 other Federal Courts of Appeals with criminal jurisdiction) ; State v. Patton, 287 Kan. 200, 228–229, 195 P. 3d 753, 771 (2008) . ”