Sandra Day O'Connor,
Ingersoll-Rand Company v. McClendon…
“ McClendon argues that the pension plan is irrelevant to the Texas cause of action because all that is at issue is the employer's improper motive to avoid its pension obligations. The argument misses the point, which is that under the Texas court's analysis there simply is no cause of action if there is no plan. ”
Sandra Day O'Connor,
Ingersoll-Rand Company v. McClendon…
“ To discern Congress' intent we examine the explicit statutory language and the structure and purpose of the statute. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56, 111 S.Ct. 403, 407, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990) , (citing Shaw, supra, 463 U.S., at 95, 103 S.Ct., at 2898-99) . Regardless of the avenue we follow-whether explicit or implied pre-emption-this state law cause of action cannot be sustained.Where, as here, Congress has expressly included a broadly worded pre-emption provision in a comprehensive statute such as ERISA, our task of discerning congressional intent is considerably simplified. ”
Sandra Day O'Connor,
Ingersoll-Rand Company v. McClendon…
“ By its terms § 510 protects plan participants from termination motivated by an employer's desire to prevent a pension from vesting. Congress viewed this section as a crucial part of ERISA because, without it, employers would be able to circumvent the provision of promised benefits. ”
