Sandra Day O'Connor

“ A state court's finding of an aggravating circumstance in a particular case including a de novo finding by an appellate court that a particular offense is "especially heinous . . . or depraved"-is arbitrary or capricious if and only if no reasonable sentencer could have so concluded. Indeed, respondent agrees that "a state court's 'especially heinous . . . or depraved' finding, insofar as it is a matter of state law, is reviewable by the federal courts only under the 'rational factfinder' rule of Jackson v. Virginia." Brief for Respondent 95-96 (emphasis added; footnote omitted) . ”

“ A State's definitions of its aggravating circumstances those circumstances that make a criminal defendant "eligible" for the death penalty-therefore play a significant role in channeling the sentencer's discretion. ”

“ Accordingly, "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." ”

“ Our holding in Walton, which disposes of respondent's claim that Arizona has not construed its subsection (F) (6) aggravating circumstance in a constitutionally narrow manner, bears repeating here:
"Recognizing that the proper degree of definition of an aggravating factor of this nature is not susceptible of mathematical precision, we conclude that the definition given to the 'especially cruel' provision by the Arizona Supreme Court is constitutionally sufficient because it gives meaningful guidance to the sentencer. ”

“ We have reiterated the general principle that aggravating circumstances must be construed to permit the sentencer to make a principled distinction between those who deserve the death penalty and those who do not. ”

“ Because the Georgia courts had not applied the narrowing construction, the plurality considered whether the Georgia Supreme Court, in affirming the death sentence, had nevertheless applied a constitutional construction of the subsection (b) (7) aggravating circumstance. Id., at 432-433, 100 S.Ct., at 1766-1767. The plurality concluded that the state court had not, because " [t] here is no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not." ”

“ The court then reviewed the trial court's finding that respondent "committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner," § 13-703 (F) (6) . The court noted that it had interpreted and applied this provision in light of the dictionary definitions of the words used:
"The element of cruelty involves the pain and the mental and physical distress visited upon the victims. Heinous and depraved involve the mental state and attitude of the perpetrator as reflected in his words and actions. 'Heinous' means 'hatefully or shockingly evil; grossly bad' ”

“ DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1871, 1871, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974) (absent a specific constitutional violation, federal habeas review of trial error is limited to whether the error "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process") . ”

“ Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (" [A] n aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder") (footnote omitted) ”