Supreme Court of the United States

“ Two intertwined principles of federal jurisdiction—Article III standing and the Rooker–Feldman doctrine [2] —mandate a finding that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over this action. The majority gives short shrift to these principles, and its holding that Reed’s claim was timely serve only to underscore its antecedent jurisdictional errors.
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The Constitution limits the federal courts’ jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Controversies,” Art. III, §2, cl. 1, constraining judicial power to “the determination of real, earnest and vital controvers [ies] between” contending litigants. ”

“ We see no good reason for such senseless duplication.
Moreover, significant systemic benefits ensue from starting the statute of limitations clock when the state litigation in DNA testing cases like Reed’s has concluded. If any due process flaws lurk in the DNA testing law, the state appellate process may cure those flaws, thereby rendering a federal §1983 suit unnecessary. And if the state appellate court construes the DNA testing statute, that construction will streamline and focus subsequent §1983 proceedings. ”

“ If the majority thinks the district attorney is wrong about that, it would only be fair to explain exactly what change in conduct would be legally required of him if Reed prevailed on his due process claim. The majority fails to do so. ”

“ Whatever merit these arguments might have in relation to the accrual date adopted by the Fifth Circuit, they ring hollow as applied to the choice between the date when a state high court issues a decision interpreting the state testing statute and the date when that court refuses to rehear and overturn that interpretation. One need not have “supernatural foresight” in order to predict that rehearing is unlikely to be granted. ”

“ First, it can be argued that Reed’s claim against Goertz accrued on or before July 2014, when Goertz initially refused Reed’s testing request. [1] The general rule is that a plaintiff’s §1983 claim against a state official for violating a constitutional right accrues when the alleged violation takes place. See Wallace, 549 U. S., at 384 (§1983 claim “normally commence [s] to run” from when wrong occurs) . And the Court does not disclaim the possibility that a plaintiff could file a §1983 claim as soon as a state prosecutor denies a DNA testing request. ”

“ The Due Process Clause applies to action through any of these agencies, ibid., but not every alleged due process violation may be asserted in an original §1983 action. By itself, a State’s legislative enactment of an unconstitutional law does not give rise to a justiciable case or controversy. ”

“ A procedural due process claim consists of two elements: (i) deprivation by state action of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property, and (ii) inadequate state process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 125 (1990) . ”

“ The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) affirmed the denial of petitioner Rodney Reed’s state-law motion for postconviction DNA testing. Reed petitioned this Court for certiorari, arguing that the CCA’s interpretation and application of the relevant state law violated his federal due process rights. After we denied his petition, Reed repackaged it as a complaint in Federal District Court, naming respondent (the Bastrop County District Attorney) as a placeholder defendant. ”

“ Here, by contrast, the majority finds redressability in an abstract declaration—in truth, an advisory opinion—that would not require any change in conduct on the part of the only defendant in this case. Nothing in our precedents supports that holding. ”

“ Yet, even after repackaging his failed certiorari petition as an original §1983 complaint, Reed not only concedes but affirmatively argues that his claim is analogous to the due process arguments presented in Rogers, Bouie, and Brinkerhoff-Faris. See Brief for Petitioner 33–34. That he is correct on that front should be fatal to his complaint. Like the petitioners in those cases, Reed contends that the rules of decision applied against him in a state-court proceeding violated his due process rights. ”

“ On June 30, 2022, for example, we did this in no fewer than 33 cases. [3] We do not wait to see if a petition for rehearing will be filed; nor do we hold off until a mandate is issued or a certified copy of the judgment is prepared. ”

“ Id., at 14, ¶3; see also id., at 49 (prayer for relief) .
The district attorney moved to dismiss Reed’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b) (1) and (b) (6) . The District Court held that it had jurisdiction but dismissed Reed’s complaint on the merits, concluding that Reed had alleged only “that he disagree [d] with the state court’s construction of Texas law” and that none of the issues in the complaint “r [ose] to the level of a procedural due-process violation.” ”

“ I have no idea where Stacey Stites was when she died.’ ” Ex parte Reed, 271 S. W. 3d, at 736. ↑ See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462 (1983) ; Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923) . ↑ The limited exceptions to these generalizations only prove the rules. Appellate courts sometimes issue remedies that operate directly on the parties (e.g., injunctions pending appeal) , but such remedies are “extraordinary” and appropriate only when “ ‘in aid of ’ ” the court’s primary appellate jurisdiction. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. ”