Summary

Thurgood Marshall Puerto Rico v. Branstad — Opinion of the Court

Dennison cannot withstand contemporary scrutiny, petitioner would not profit from its demise because Puerto Rico is not a State, and has no right to demand rendition of fugitives under the Extradition Clause. It is true that the words of the Clause apply only to "States," and we have never held that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is entitled to all the benefits conferred upon the States under the Constitution. We need not decide today what applicability the Extradition Clause may have to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, however, for the Extradition Act clearly applies.
Source: Wikisource

Thurgood Marshall Puerto Rico v. Branstad — Opinion of the Court

It would be superfluous to restate all the occasions on which this Court has imposed upon state officials a duty to obey the requirements of the Constitution, or compelled the performance of such duties; it may suffice to refer to Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) , and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) . The fundamental premise of the holding in Dennison
that the States and the Federal Government in all circumstances must be viewed as coequal sovereigns — is not representative of the law today.
Source: Wikisource

Thurgood Marshall Puerto Rico v. Branstad — Opinion of the Court

And we think it clear that the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it. Ibid.
II B Thus, for over 125 years, Kentucky v. Dennison has stood for two propositions: first, that the Extradition Clause creates a mandatory duty to deliver up fugitives upon proper demand; and second, that the federal courts have no authority under the Constitution to compel performance of this ministerial duty of delivery.
Source: Wikisource

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